Group as a Distributed Subject of Knowledge: Between Radicalism and Triviality
In the paper, I distinguish the bottom-up strategy and the intentional stance strategy of analyzing group intentional states, and show that the thesis of distributed group subject of knowledge could be accommodated by either of them. Moreover, I argue that when combined with virtue reliabilism the t...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Maria Curie-Sklodowska University
2017-08-01
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| Series: | Avant |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://avant.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/Trybulec-B-Groups-as-a-Distributed.pdf |
| _version_ | 1797426461306519552 |
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| author | Barbara Trybulec |
| author_facet | Barbara Trybulec |
| author_sort | Barbara Trybulec |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In the paper, I distinguish the bottom-up strategy and the intentional stance strategy of analyzing group intentional states, and show that the thesis of distributed group subject of knowledge could be accommodated by either of them. Moreover, I argue that when combined with virtue reliabilism the thesis satisfactorily explains the phenomenon of group knowledge. To justify my argument, in the second part of the paper, I distinguish two accounts of justification pointing to conditions of group knowledge. The first, which I call the belief-centered approach to group intentional states, determines the concept of group belief and group justificatory reason. The second, the process-centered approach represented by S. Orestis Palermos, employs the theory of virtue reliabilism and focuses on the group knowledge-conducive process. In the paper, I argue in favor of the latter as the internalism associated with the former appears to lack sufficient explanatory power. The theory of virtue epistemology runs into considerable difficulties when trying to deal with an extended epistemic subject composed of one individual and her cognitive artifact. In the two last parts of the paper, I consider the most important difficulties and argue that these obstacles are overcome once one adopts an approach combining virtue epistemology and the thesis of distributed group epistemic subject. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-09T08:30:33Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-34ade77d27844ef3bd6528854651f71e |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2082-6710 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-09T08:30:33Z |
| publishDate | 2017-08-01 |
| publisher | Maria Curie-Sklodowska University |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Avant |
| spelling | doaj.art-34ade77d27844ef3bd6528854651f71e2023-12-02T20:05:39ZengMaria Curie-Sklodowska UniversityAvant2082-67102017-08-018118320710.26913/80102017.0101.0012Group as a Distributed Subject of Knowledge: Between Radicalism and TrivialityBarbara TrybulecIn the paper, I distinguish the bottom-up strategy and the intentional stance strategy of analyzing group intentional states, and show that the thesis of distributed group subject of knowledge could be accommodated by either of them. Moreover, I argue that when combined with virtue reliabilism the thesis satisfactorily explains the phenomenon of group knowledge. To justify my argument, in the second part of the paper, I distinguish two accounts of justification pointing to conditions of group knowledge. The first, which I call the belief-centered approach to group intentional states, determines the concept of group belief and group justificatory reason. The second, the process-centered approach represented by S. Orestis Palermos, employs the theory of virtue reliabilism and focuses on the group knowledge-conducive process. In the paper, I argue in favor of the latter as the internalism associated with the former appears to lack sufficient explanatory power. The theory of virtue epistemology runs into considerable difficulties when trying to deal with an extended epistemic subject composed of one individual and her cognitive artifact. In the two last parts of the paper, I consider the most important difficulties and argue that these obstacles are overcome once one adopts an approach combining virtue epistemology and the thesis of distributed group epistemic subject.http://avant.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/Trybulec-B-Groups-as-a-Distributed.pdfgroup agencyepistemic subjectgroup knowledgeintentional statecognitive processdistributed cognition |
| spellingShingle | Barbara Trybulec Group as a Distributed Subject of Knowledge: Between Radicalism and Triviality Avant group agency epistemic subject group knowledge intentional state cognitive process distributed cognition |
| title | Group as a Distributed Subject of Knowledge: Between Radicalism and Triviality |
| title_full | Group as a Distributed Subject of Knowledge: Between Radicalism and Triviality |
| title_fullStr | Group as a Distributed Subject of Knowledge: Between Radicalism and Triviality |
| title_full_unstemmed | Group as a Distributed Subject of Knowledge: Between Radicalism and Triviality |
| title_short | Group as a Distributed Subject of Knowledge: Between Radicalism and Triviality |
| title_sort | group as a distributed subject of knowledge between radicalism and triviality |
| topic | group agency epistemic subject group knowledge intentional state cognitive process distributed cognition |
| url | http://avant.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/Trybulec-B-Groups-as-a-Distributed.pdf |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT barbaratrybulec groupasadistributedsubjectofknowledgebetweenradicalismandtriviality |