Study and Validation of Eavesdropping Scenarios over a Visible Light Communication Channel
The security and privacy provided by Visible Light Communication (VLC) technologies is an area that has been slightly addressed due to the misconception that, since light does not go through solid objects like walls, VLC-based communications cannot be eavesdropped on by outside observers. As an upco...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2017-11-01
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Series: | Sensors |
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Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/17/11/2687 |
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author | Ignacio Marin-Garcia Victor Guerra Rafael Perez-Jimenez |
author_facet | Ignacio Marin-Garcia Victor Guerra Rafael Perez-Jimenez |
author_sort | Ignacio Marin-Garcia |
collection | DOAJ |
description | The security and privacy provided by Visible Light Communication (VLC) technologies is an area that has been slightly addressed due to the misconception that, since light does not go through solid objects like walls, VLC-based communications cannot be eavesdropped on by outside observers. As an upcoming technology, VLC is expected to be used in multiple environments were, due to radio frequency RF overuse or limitations, RF solutions cannot or should not be employed. In this work, we study the eavesdropping characteristics of a VLC-based communication. To evaluate these concerns, a two-step process was followed. First, several simulations of a standardly used scenario were run. Later on, experimental tests were performed. Following those tests, the results of the simulations and the experimental tests were analyzed. The results of these simulations and tests seemed to indicate that VLC channels can be eavesdropped on without considerable difficulties. Furthermore, the results showed that sniffing attacks could be performed from areas outside the expected coverage of the VLC infrastructure. Finally, the use of the simulation such as the one implemented in this work to recognize places from which sniffing is possible helps determine the risk for eavesdropping that our VLC-based network has. |
first_indexed | 2024-04-11T21:40:04Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-35310d5818fd4e599aad65e096ebb86e |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 1424-8220 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-04-11T21:40:04Z |
publishDate | 2017-11-01 |
publisher | MDPI AG |
record_format | Article |
series | Sensors |
spelling | doaj.art-35310d5818fd4e599aad65e096ebb86e2022-12-22T04:01:36ZengMDPI AGSensors1424-82202017-11-011711268710.3390/s17112687s17112687Study and Validation of Eavesdropping Scenarios over a Visible Light Communication ChannelIgnacio Marin-Garcia0Victor Guerra1Rafael Perez-Jimenez2Facultad de Ingenieria en Electricidad y Computacion, Escuela Superior Politecnica del Litoral (ESPOL), P.O. Box 09-01-5863 Guayaquil, EcuadorInstituto para el Desarrollo de las Telecomunicaciones (IDeTIC), Universidad de las Palmas de Gran Canaria, 35001 Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, SpainInstituto para el Desarrollo de las Telecomunicaciones (IDeTIC), Universidad de las Palmas de Gran Canaria, 35001 Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, SpainThe security and privacy provided by Visible Light Communication (VLC) technologies is an area that has been slightly addressed due to the misconception that, since light does not go through solid objects like walls, VLC-based communications cannot be eavesdropped on by outside observers. As an upcoming technology, VLC is expected to be used in multiple environments were, due to radio frequency RF overuse or limitations, RF solutions cannot or should not be employed. In this work, we study the eavesdropping characteristics of a VLC-based communication. To evaluate these concerns, a two-step process was followed. First, several simulations of a standardly used scenario were run. Later on, experimental tests were performed. Following those tests, the results of the simulations and the experimental tests were analyzed. The results of these simulations and tests seemed to indicate that VLC channels can be eavesdropped on without considerable difficulties. Furthermore, the results showed that sniffing attacks could be performed from areas outside the expected coverage of the VLC infrastructure. Finally, the use of the simulation such as the one implemented in this work to recognize places from which sniffing is possible helps determine the risk for eavesdropping that our VLC-based network has.https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/17/11/2687visible light communicationnetwork securitydata sniffingeavesdroppinginformation assurancecommunication |
spellingShingle | Ignacio Marin-Garcia Victor Guerra Rafael Perez-Jimenez Study and Validation of Eavesdropping Scenarios over a Visible Light Communication Channel Sensors visible light communication network security data sniffing eavesdropping information assurance communication |
title | Study and Validation of Eavesdropping Scenarios over a Visible Light Communication Channel |
title_full | Study and Validation of Eavesdropping Scenarios over a Visible Light Communication Channel |
title_fullStr | Study and Validation of Eavesdropping Scenarios over a Visible Light Communication Channel |
title_full_unstemmed | Study and Validation of Eavesdropping Scenarios over a Visible Light Communication Channel |
title_short | Study and Validation of Eavesdropping Scenarios over a Visible Light Communication Channel |
title_sort | study and validation of eavesdropping scenarios over a visible light communication channel |
topic | visible light communication network security data sniffing eavesdropping information assurance communication |
url | https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/17/11/2687 |
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