Study and Validation of Eavesdropping Scenarios over a Visible Light Communication Channel

The security and privacy provided by Visible Light Communication (VLC) technologies is an area that has been slightly addressed due to the misconception that, since light does not go through solid objects like walls, VLC-based communications cannot be eavesdropped on by outside observers. As an upco...

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Main Authors: Ignacio Marin-Garcia, Victor Guerra, Rafael Perez-Jimenez
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2017-11-01
Series:Sensors
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/17/11/2687
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author Ignacio Marin-Garcia
Victor Guerra
Rafael Perez-Jimenez
author_facet Ignacio Marin-Garcia
Victor Guerra
Rafael Perez-Jimenez
author_sort Ignacio Marin-Garcia
collection DOAJ
description The security and privacy provided by Visible Light Communication (VLC) technologies is an area that has been slightly addressed due to the misconception that, since light does not go through solid objects like walls, VLC-based communications cannot be eavesdropped on by outside observers. As an upcoming technology, VLC is expected to be used in multiple environments were, due to radio frequency RF overuse or limitations, RF solutions cannot or should not be employed. In this work, we study the eavesdropping characteristics of a VLC-based communication. To evaluate these concerns, a two-step process was followed. First, several simulations of a standardly used scenario were run. Later on, experimental tests were performed. Following those tests, the results of the simulations and the experimental tests were analyzed. The results of these simulations and tests seemed to indicate that VLC channels can be eavesdropped on without considerable difficulties. Furthermore, the results showed that sniffing attacks could be performed from areas outside the expected coverage of the VLC infrastructure. Finally, the use of the simulation such as the one implemented in this work to recognize places from which sniffing is possible helps determine the risk for eavesdropping that our VLC-based network has.
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spelling doaj.art-35310d5818fd4e599aad65e096ebb86e2022-12-22T04:01:36ZengMDPI AGSensors1424-82202017-11-011711268710.3390/s17112687s17112687Study and Validation of Eavesdropping Scenarios over a Visible Light Communication ChannelIgnacio Marin-Garcia0Victor Guerra1Rafael Perez-Jimenez2Facultad de Ingenieria en Electricidad y Computacion, Escuela Superior Politecnica del Litoral (ESPOL), P.O. Box 09-01-5863 Guayaquil, EcuadorInstituto para el Desarrollo de las Telecomunicaciones (IDeTIC), Universidad de las Palmas de Gran Canaria, 35001 Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, SpainInstituto para el Desarrollo de las Telecomunicaciones (IDeTIC), Universidad de las Palmas de Gran Canaria, 35001 Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, SpainThe security and privacy provided by Visible Light Communication (VLC) technologies is an area that has been slightly addressed due to the misconception that, since light does not go through solid objects like walls, VLC-based communications cannot be eavesdropped on by outside observers. As an upcoming technology, VLC is expected to be used in multiple environments were, due to radio frequency RF overuse or limitations, RF solutions cannot or should not be employed. In this work, we study the eavesdropping characteristics of a VLC-based communication. To evaluate these concerns, a two-step process was followed. First, several simulations of a standardly used scenario were run. Later on, experimental tests were performed. Following those tests, the results of the simulations and the experimental tests were analyzed. The results of these simulations and tests seemed to indicate that VLC channels can be eavesdropped on without considerable difficulties. Furthermore, the results showed that sniffing attacks could be performed from areas outside the expected coverage of the VLC infrastructure. Finally, the use of the simulation such as the one implemented in this work to recognize places from which sniffing is possible helps determine the risk for eavesdropping that our VLC-based network has.https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/17/11/2687visible light communicationnetwork securitydata sniffingeavesdroppinginformation assurancecommunication
spellingShingle Ignacio Marin-Garcia
Victor Guerra
Rafael Perez-Jimenez
Study and Validation of Eavesdropping Scenarios over a Visible Light Communication Channel
Sensors
visible light communication
network security
data sniffing
eavesdropping
information assurance
communication
title Study and Validation of Eavesdropping Scenarios over a Visible Light Communication Channel
title_full Study and Validation of Eavesdropping Scenarios over a Visible Light Communication Channel
title_fullStr Study and Validation of Eavesdropping Scenarios over a Visible Light Communication Channel
title_full_unstemmed Study and Validation of Eavesdropping Scenarios over a Visible Light Communication Channel
title_short Study and Validation of Eavesdropping Scenarios over a Visible Light Communication Channel
title_sort study and validation of eavesdropping scenarios over a visible light communication channel
topic visible light communication
network security
data sniffing
eavesdropping
information assurance
communication
url https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/17/11/2687
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