Human capital and corruption: a microeconomic model of the bribes market with democratic contestability
To overcome market failures society creates common laws that stimulate or penalize individual actions, the enforcement of which depends on the actions of public authorities who may be susceptible to corruption. We model this behaviour for an autocracy versus a democracy, using a microeconomic framew...
Main Authors: | , |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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Coimbra University Press
2006-06-01
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Series: | Notas Económicas |
Online Access: | https://impactum-journals.uc.pt/notaseconomicas/article/view/3648 |
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author | Pedro Cosme Costa Vieira Aurora A. C. Teixeira |
author_facet | Pedro Cosme Costa Vieira Aurora A. C. Teixeira |
author_sort | Pedro Cosme Costa Vieira |
collection | DOAJ |
description | To overcome market failures society creates common laws that stimulate or penalize individual actions, the enforcement of which depends on the actions of public authorities who may be susceptible to corruption. We model this behaviour for an autocracy versus a democracy, using a microeconomic framework. We assume that in an autocracy rulers have a monopoly over the bribes market, whereas in a democracy conflicting groups compete in the bribes market. The models constructed produce results that are compatible with the well-known stylized facts, namely that (1) in a democracy the level of corruption is lower than in an autocracy, although still positive, that (2) in environments where the level of human capital is higher, regimes are closer to democracies and the level of corruption is lower, and that (3) the level of corruption is higher in more regulated economies. |
first_indexed | 2024-12-13T14:02:28Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-37a8e022f09c4bc18a683598257a1849 |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 0872-4733 2183-203X |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-12-13T14:02:28Z |
publishDate | 2006-06-01 |
publisher | Coimbra University Press |
record_format | Article |
series | Notas Económicas |
spelling | doaj.art-37a8e022f09c4bc18a683598257a18492022-12-21T23:42:41ZengCoimbra University PressNotas Económicas0872-47332183-203X2006-06-012310.14195/2183-203X_23_4Human capital and corruption: a microeconomic model of the bribes market with democratic contestabilityPedro Cosme Costa Vieira0Aurora A. C. TeixeiraUniversidade de CoimbraTo overcome market failures society creates common laws that stimulate or penalize individual actions, the enforcement of which depends on the actions of public authorities who may be susceptible to corruption. We model this behaviour for an autocracy versus a democracy, using a microeconomic framework. We assume that in an autocracy rulers have a monopoly over the bribes market, whereas in a democracy conflicting groups compete in the bribes market. The models constructed produce results that are compatible with the well-known stylized facts, namely that (1) in a democracy the level of corruption is lower than in an autocracy, although still positive, that (2) in environments where the level of human capital is higher, regimes are closer to democracies and the level of corruption is lower, and that (3) the level of corruption is higher in more regulated economies.https://impactum-journals.uc.pt/notaseconomicas/article/view/3648 |
spellingShingle | Pedro Cosme Costa Vieira Aurora A. C. Teixeira Human capital and corruption: a microeconomic model of the bribes market with democratic contestability Notas Económicas |
title | Human capital and corruption: a microeconomic model of the bribes market with democratic contestability |
title_full | Human capital and corruption: a microeconomic model of the bribes market with democratic contestability |
title_fullStr | Human capital and corruption: a microeconomic model of the bribes market with democratic contestability |
title_full_unstemmed | Human capital and corruption: a microeconomic model of the bribes market with democratic contestability |
title_short | Human capital and corruption: a microeconomic model of the bribes market with democratic contestability |
title_sort | human capital and corruption a microeconomic model of the bribes market with democratic contestability |
url | https://impactum-journals.uc.pt/notaseconomicas/article/view/3648 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT pedrocosmecostavieira humancapitalandcorruptionamicroeconomicmodelofthebribesmarketwithdemocraticcontestability AT auroraacteixeira humancapitalandcorruptionamicroeconomicmodelofthebribesmarketwithdemocraticcontestability |