Human capital and corruption: a microeconomic model of the bribes market with democratic contestability

To overcome market failures society creates common laws that stimulate or penalize individual actions, the enforcement of which depends on the actions of public authorities who may be susceptible to corruption. We model this behaviour for an autocracy versus a democracy, using a microeconomic framew...

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Main Authors: Pedro Cosme Costa Vieira, Aurora A. C. Teixeira
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Coimbra University Press 2006-06-01
Series:Notas Económicas
Online Access:https://impactum-journals.uc.pt/notaseconomicas/article/view/3648
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author Pedro Cosme Costa Vieira
Aurora A. C. Teixeira
author_facet Pedro Cosme Costa Vieira
Aurora A. C. Teixeira
author_sort Pedro Cosme Costa Vieira
collection DOAJ
description To overcome market failures society creates common laws that stimulate or penalize individual actions, the enforcement of which depends on the actions of public authorities who may be susceptible to corruption. We model this behaviour for an autocracy versus a democracy, using a microeconomic framework. We assume that in an autocracy rulers have a monopoly over the bribes market, whereas in a democracy conflicting groups compete in the bribes market. The models constructed produce results that are compatible with the well-known stylized facts, namely that (1) in a democracy the level of corruption is lower than in an autocracy, although still positive, that (2) in environments where the level of human capital is higher, regimes are closer to democracies and the level of corruption is lower, and that (3) the level of corruption is higher in more regulated economies.
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spelling doaj.art-37a8e022f09c4bc18a683598257a18492022-12-21T23:42:41ZengCoimbra University PressNotas Económicas0872-47332183-203X2006-06-012310.14195/2183-203X_23_4Human capital and corruption: a microeconomic model of the bribes market with democratic contestabilityPedro Cosme Costa Vieira0Aurora A. C. TeixeiraUniversidade de CoimbraTo overcome market failures society creates common laws that stimulate or penalize individual actions, the enforcement of which depends on the actions of public authorities who may be susceptible to corruption. We model this behaviour for an autocracy versus a democracy, using a microeconomic framework. We assume that in an autocracy rulers have a monopoly over the bribes market, whereas in a democracy conflicting groups compete in the bribes market. The models constructed produce results that are compatible with the well-known stylized facts, namely that (1) in a democracy the level of corruption is lower than in an autocracy, although still positive, that (2) in environments where the level of human capital is higher, regimes are closer to democracies and the level of corruption is lower, and that (3) the level of corruption is higher in more regulated economies.https://impactum-journals.uc.pt/notaseconomicas/article/view/3648
spellingShingle Pedro Cosme Costa Vieira
Aurora A. C. Teixeira
Human capital and corruption: a microeconomic model of the bribes market with democratic contestability
Notas Económicas
title Human capital and corruption: a microeconomic model of the bribes market with democratic contestability
title_full Human capital and corruption: a microeconomic model of the bribes market with democratic contestability
title_fullStr Human capital and corruption: a microeconomic model of the bribes market with democratic contestability
title_full_unstemmed Human capital and corruption: a microeconomic model of the bribes market with democratic contestability
title_short Human capital and corruption: a microeconomic model of the bribes market with democratic contestability
title_sort human capital and corruption a microeconomic model of the bribes market with democratic contestability
url https://impactum-journals.uc.pt/notaseconomicas/article/view/3648
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