Kant on the Rationality of Moral Judgment
The paper deals with Kant's conception of moral judgment. I start by criticizing a dominant interpretation of Kant's practical rationality in its assertion that choosing, i.e. exercising judgment consists in adopting a maxim; and adopting a maxim is equivalent to acting on a principle, giv...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | fas |
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Allameh Tabataba'i University Press
2005-06-01
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| Series: | حکمت و فلسفه |
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| Online Access: | https://wph.atu.ac.ir/article_6908_b8edcb9bfd472040c04afa86bafc4aa5.pdf |
| Summary: | The paper deals with Kant's conception of moral judgment. I start by criticizing a dominant interpretation of Kant's practical rationality in its assertion that choosing, i.e. exercising judgment consists in adopting a maxim; and adopting a maxim is equivalent to acting on a principle, giving oneself the moral law (Korsgaard). According to this view, the logical inescapability of choosing alivqys already places us within the normative realm. I argue that there is a further function suppressed by this view, which can be termed as approval. This takes us to the further acknowledgement that the core of Kant's practical rationality, that is, the moral question itself, is not simply one of moral knowledge [Wissen], but a broader one of cognition in general [Erkenntnis]. |
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| ISSN: | 1735-3238 2476-6038 |