Kant on the Rationality of Moral Judgment
The paper deals with Kant's conception of moral judgment. I start by criticizing a dominant interpretation of Kant's practical rationality in its assertion that choosing, i.e. exercising judgment consists in adopting a maxim; and adopting a maxim is equivalent to acting on a principle, giv...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | fas |
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Allameh Tabataba'i University Press
2005-06-01
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| Series: | حکمت و فلسفه |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://wph.atu.ac.ir/article_6908_b8edcb9bfd472040c04afa86bafc4aa5.pdf |
| _version_ | 1827580858306920448 |
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| author | kostas kokozelis |
| author_facet | kostas kokozelis |
| author_sort | kostas kokozelis |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The paper deals with Kant's conception of moral judgment. I start by criticizing a dominant interpretation of Kant's practical rationality in its assertion that choosing, i.e. exercising judgment consists in adopting a maxim; and adopting a maxim is equivalent to acting on a principle, giving oneself the moral law (Korsgaard). According to this view, the logical inescapability of choosing alivqys already places us within the normative realm. I argue that there is a further function suppressed by this view, which can be termed as approval. This takes us to the further acknowledgement that the core of Kant's practical rationality, that is, the moral question itself, is not simply one of moral knowledge [Wissen], but a broader one of cognition in general [Erkenntnis]. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-08T22:26:11Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-3860a0b84d1940098329e3af38a4983f |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1735-3238 2476-6038 |
| language | fas |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-08T22:26:11Z |
| publishDate | 2005-06-01 |
| publisher | Allameh Tabataba'i University Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | حکمت و فلسفه |
| spelling | doaj.art-3860a0b84d1940098329e3af38a4983f2023-12-18T10:32:03ZfasAllameh Tabataba'i University Pressحکمت و فلسفه1735-32382476-60382005-06-0112183010.22054/wph.2005.69086908Kant on the Rationality of Moral Judgmentkostas kokozelis0Goldsmiths College, University of LondonThe paper deals with Kant's conception of moral judgment. I start by criticizing a dominant interpretation of Kant's practical rationality in its assertion that choosing, i.e. exercising judgment consists in adopting a maxim; and adopting a maxim is equivalent to acting on a principle, giving oneself the moral law (Korsgaard). According to this view, the logical inescapability of choosing alivqys already places us within the normative realm. I argue that there is a further function suppressed by this view, which can be termed as approval. This takes us to the further acknowledgement that the core of Kant's practical rationality, that is, the moral question itself, is not simply one of moral knowledge [Wissen], but a broader one of cognition in general [Erkenntnis].https://wph.atu.ac.ir/article_6908_b8edcb9bfd472040c04afa86bafc4aa5.pdfkantmoral judgmentkorsgaardpractical rationality |
| spellingShingle | kostas kokozelis Kant on the Rationality of Moral Judgment حکمت و فلسفه kant moral judgment korsgaard practical rationality |
| title | Kant on the Rationality of Moral Judgment |
| title_full | Kant on the Rationality of Moral Judgment |
| title_fullStr | Kant on the Rationality of Moral Judgment |
| title_full_unstemmed | Kant on the Rationality of Moral Judgment |
| title_short | Kant on the Rationality of Moral Judgment |
| title_sort | kant on the rationality of moral judgment |
| topic | kant moral judgment korsgaard practical rationality |
| url | https://wph.atu.ac.ir/article_6908_b8edcb9bfd472040c04afa86bafc4aa5.pdf |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT kostaskokozelis kantontherationalityofmoraljudgment |