What Becomes of the Damned

Annihilationism provides a fruitful point of contact between philosophers and theologians for further reflection on nonexistence. In this paper I articulate a key commitment of annihilationism; namely, that some persons cease to exist. Such a commitment, I argue, amounts to the claim that some pers...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: R. A. J. Shields
Format: Article
Language:deu
Published: Catholic University of Louvain 2023-11-01
Series:TheoLogica
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ojs.uclouvain.be/index.php/theologica/article/view/65443
Description
Summary:Annihilationism provides a fruitful point of contact between philosophers and theologians for further reflection on nonexistence. In this paper I articulate a key commitment of annihilationism; namely, that some persons cease to exist. Such a commitment, I argue, amounts to the claim that some persons exist at time t and then do not exist at t+1, become ‘annihilated objects.’ Claims about annihilated objects induct the annihilationist into a wider realism/anti-realism debate about nonexistent objects. I survey some major viewpoints in this debate. I then draw out some implications for each view for the annihilationist’s commitment to annihilated objects. I show that annihilationism is consistent with some forms of realism and anti-realism and inconsistent with others.
ISSN:2593-0265