Intentionalism and the Problem of the Object of Perception

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I intend to review the intentionalist account of perceptual experience in order to deal with some difficulties that it faces in adequately specifying the nature and object of perceptual experience. My aim is to show that it is possible for the intentionalists to incorporate...

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Main Author: Karla Chediak
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Universidade Estadual Paulista 2016-06-01
Series:Trans/Form/Ação
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31732016000200087&lng=en&tlng=en
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author Karla Chediak
author_facet Karla Chediak
author_sort Karla Chediak
collection DOAJ
description ABSTRACT: In this paper, I intend to review the intentionalist account of perceptual experience in order to deal with some difficulties that it faces in adequately specifying the nature and object of perceptual experience. My aim is to show that it is possible for the intentionalists to incorporate the disjunctivist thesis that the object of perception is part of perceptual experiences, without renouncing the common factor principle. I argue that, in order to do this, it is necessary to engage with the concept of biological function and to review the concept of a perceptual object.
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spelling doaj.art-3923fab882824949a63b4514cca8c8b82023-02-02T13:18:45ZengUniversidade Estadual PaulistaTrans/Form/Ação1980-539X2016-06-013928710010.1590/S0101-31732016000200005S0101-31732016000200087Intentionalism and the Problem of the Object of PerceptionKarla ChediakABSTRACT: In this paper, I intend to review the intentionalist account of perceptual experience in order to deal with some difficulties that it faces in adequately specifying the nature and object of perceptual experience. My aim is to show that it is possible for the intentionalists to incorporate the disjunctivist thesis that the object of perception is part of perceptual experiences, without renouncing the common factor principle. I argue that, in order to do this, it is necessary to engage with the concept of biological function and to review the concept of a perceptual object.http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31732016000200087&lng=en&tlng=enIntencionalismo perceptivoObjeto intencionalAlucinaçãoDisjuntivismoFunção biológica
spellingShingle Karla Chediak
Intentionalism and the Problem of the Object of Perception
Trans/Form/Ação
Intencionalismo perceptivo
Objeto intencional
Alucinação
Disjuntivismo
Função biológica
title Intentionalism and the Problem of the Object of Perception
title_full Intentionalism and the Problem of the Object of Perception
title_fullStr Intentionalism and the Problem of the Object of Perception
title_full_unstemmed Intentionalism and the Problem of the Object of Perception
title_short Intentionalism and the Problem of the Object of Perception
title_sort intentionalism and the problem of the object of perception
topic Intencionalismo perceptivo
Objeto intencional
Alucinação
Disjuntivismo
Função biológica
url http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31732016000200087&lng=en&tlng=en
work_keys_str_mv AT karlachediak intentionalismandtheproblemoftheobjectofperception