Generalized Backward Induction: Justification for a Folk Algorithm
I introduce axiomatically infinite sequential games that extend Kuhn’s classical framework. Infinite games allow for (a) imperfect information, (b) an infinite horizon, and (c) infinite action sets. A generalized backward induction (GBI) procedure is defined for all such games over the roots of subg...
Main Author: | Marek Mikolaj Kaminski |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
MDPI AG
2019-08-01
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Series: | Games |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/10/3/34 |
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