A Dilemma for Sterba
James Sterba argues that a good God is not logically possible. He argues that what he calls the Pauline Principle, which says that we should never do evil that good may come of it, implies that a good God would prevent horrendous evil consequences of immoral actions. However, there are plenty of exa...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2022-08-01
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| Series: | Religions |
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| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/13/9/783 |
| _version_ | 1797482922758897664 |
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| author | Bruce Russell |
| author_facet | Bruce Russell |
| author_sort | Bruce Russell |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | James Sterba argues that a good God is not logically possible. He argues that what he calls the Pauline Principle, which says that we should never do evil that good may come of it, implies that a good God would prevent horrendous evil consequences of immoral actions. However, there are plenty of examples of such actions in our world. So, a good God does not exist. I offer an example from Derek Parfit, and one of my own, that calls the Pauline Principle into question. Sterba believes that what he calls Moral Evil Prevention Requirements (MEPRs) follow from the Pauline Principle, and that they are necessary truths which imply that a good God would prevent horrendous evil consequences of immoral actions. Whether these (MEPRs) follow from the Pauline Principle or do not, they may be necessary truths that could form the basis of Sterba’s argument. However, I argue that they are not necessary truths. If modified to become such, Sterba faces a challenge from the Skeptical Theists that can only be met by turning his argument into an evidential version of the problem of evil. I compare Sterba’s argument with my version of the evidential argument from evil that says that if God exists, there is not excessive, unnecessary suffering and whose second premise says there is. I argue that it is easier to establish that there is excessive, unnecessary suffering than to establish Sterba’s second premise (once his principles are modified). That second premise will say that there are no goods that logically require God to allow immoral actions that have horrendous evil consequences. Sterba faces a dilemma: either he has an unsound logical argument or a weak evidential argument for the non-existence of God. In either case, he does not have a good logical argument for atheism. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-09T22:40:25Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-3948c6a2c2e24d008e3a3b409895a1ff |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2077-1444 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-09T22:40:25Z |
| publishDate | 2022-08-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Religions |
| spelling | doaj.art-3948c6a2c2e24d008e3a3b409895a1ff2023-11-23T18:40:51ZengMDPI AGReligions2077-14442022-08-0113978310.3390/rel13090783A Dilemma for SterbaBruce Russell0Wayne State University, Detroit, MI 48201, USAJames Sterba argues that a good God is not logically possible. He argues that what he calls the Pauline Principle, which says that we should never do evil that good may come of it, implies that a good God would prevent horrendous evil consequences of immoral actions. However, there are plenty of examples of such actions in our world. So, a good God does not exist. I offer an example from Derek Parfit, and one of my own, that calls the Pauline Principle into question. Sterba believes that what he calls Moral Evil Prevention Requirements (MEPRs) follow from the Pauline Principle, and that they are necessary truths which imply that a good God would prevent horrendous evil consequences of immoral actions. Whether these (MEPRs) follow from the Pauline Principle or do not, they may be necessary truths that could form the basis of Sterba’s argument. However, I argue that they are not necessary truths. If modified to become such, Sterba faces a challenge from the Skeptical Theists that can only be met by turning his argument into an evidential version of the problem of evil. I compare Sterba’s argument with my version of the evidential argument from evil that says that if God exists, there is not excessive, unnecessary suffering and whose second premise says there is. I argue that it is easier to establish that there is excessive, unnecessary suffering than to establish Sterba’s second premise (once his principles are modified). That second premise will say that there are no goods that logically require God to allow immoral actions that have horrendous evil consequences. Sterba faces a dilemma: either he has an unsound logical argument or a weak evidential argument for the non-existence of God. In either case, he does not have a good logical argument for atheism.https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/13/9/783the problem of evilPauline PrincipleDoctrine of the Double EffectSkeptical TheismMoral Evil Prevention Requirementshorrendous evil consequences of immoral actions |
| spellingShingle | Bruce Russell A Dilemma for Sterba Religions the problem of evil Pauline Principle Doctrine of the Double Effect Skeptical Theism Moral Evil Prevention Requirements horrendous evil consequences of immoral actions |
| title | A Dilemma for Sterba |
| title_full | A Dilemma for Sterba |
| title_fullStr | A Dilemma for Sterba |
| title_full_unstemmed | A Dilemma for Sterba |
| title_short | A Dilemma for Sterba |
| title_sort | dilemma for sterba |
| topic | the problem of evil Pauline Principle Doctrine of the Double Effect Skeptical Theism Moral Evil Prevention Requirements horrendous evil consequences of immoral actions |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/13/9/783 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT brucerussell adilemmaforsterba AT brucerussell dilemmaforsterba |