Investing in the commons: transient welfare creates incentives despite open access

Local users may invest in managing common pool resources, thereby promoting social and ecological resilience. Institutional or economic limits on access are regarded as essential preconditions for incentivizing local investments, but we show that investment incentives can exist even under open acces...

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Main Authors: Jacob P. Ziegler, Sunny L. Jardine, Stuart E. Jones, Brett T. van Poorten, Marco A. Janssen, Christopher T. Solomon
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Resilience Alliance 2021-06-01
Series:Ecology and Society
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol26/iss2/art16/
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author Jacob P. Ziegler
Sunny L. Jardine
Stuart E. Jones
Brett T. van Poorten
Marco A. Janssen
Christopher T. Solomon
author_facet Jacob P. Ziegler
Sunny L. Jardine
Stuart E. Jones
Brett T. van Poorten
Marco A. Janssen
Christopher T. Solomon
author_sort Jacob P. Ziegler
collection DOAJ
description Local users may invest in managing common pool resources, thereby promoting social and ecological resilience. Institutional or economic limits on access are regarded as essential preconditions for incentivizing local investments, but we show that investment incentives can exist even under open access. We modeled a recreational harvest fishery in which local or centralized managers invest in fish stocking to maximize social welfare. Although classic open access dissipation of rents occurs at equilibrium, the sluggish response of fishing effort to changing conditions allows welfare to accrue in transition to equilibrium. This transient welfare creates persistent incentives to invest. Empirical observations showed that stocking by local collective action groups occurred at rates similar to model-predicted optima, while centralized stocking occurred at rates greater than predicted optima. Our results emphasize the potential benefits of local involvement in managing the commons, even under conditions that were previously thought to preclude effective collective action.
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spelling doaj.art-396cb96855614c47be735b635a6f82a12022-12-21T22:07:35ZengResilience AllianceEcology and Society1708-30872021-06-012621610.5751/ES-12339-26021612339Investing in the commons: transient welfare creates incentives despite open accessJacob P. Ziegler0Sunny L. Jardine1Stuart E. Jones2Brett T. van Poorten3Marco A. Janssen4Christopher T. Solomon5Department of Natural Resource Sciences, McGill UniversitySchool of Marine and Environmental Affairs, University of WashingtonDepartment of Biological Sciences, University of Notre DameSimon Fraser UniversitySchool of Sustainability, Arizona State UniversityCary Institute of Ecosystem StudiesLocal users may invest in managing common pool resources, thereby promoting social and ecological resilience. Institutional or economic limits on access are regarded as essential preconditions for incentivizing local investments, but we show that investment incentives can exist even under open access. We modeled a recreational harvest fishery in which local or centralized managers invest in fish stocking to maximize social welfare. Although classic open access dissipation of rents occurs at equilibrium, the sluggish response of fishing effort to changing conditions allows welfare to accrue in transition to equilibrium. This transient welfare creates persistent incentives to invest. Empirical observations showed that stocking by local collective action groups occurred at rates similar to model-predicted optima, while centralized stocking occurred at rates greater than predicted optima. Our results emphasize the potential benefits of local involvement in managing the commons, even under conditions that were previously thought to preclude effective collective action.https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol26/iss2/art16/anglercollective actioncommon pool resourcefish stockingfisherylake associationopen accesspolycentric governancesocial-ecological system
spellingShingle Jacob P. Ziegler
Sunny L. Jardine
Stuart E. Jones
Brett T. van Poorten
Marco A. Janssen
Christopher T. Solomon
Investing in the commons: transient welfare creates incentives despite open access
Ecology and Society
angler
collective action
common pool resource
fish stocking
fishery
lake association
open access
polycentric governance
social-ecological system
title Investing in the commons: transient welfare creates incentives despite open access
title_full Investing in the commons: transient welfare creates incentives despite open access
title_fullStr Investing in the commons: transient welfare creates incentives despite open access
title_full_unstemmed Investing in the commons: transient welfare creates incentives despite open access
title_short Investing in the commons: transient welfare creates incentives despite open access
title_sort investing in the commons transient welfare creates incentives despite open access
topic angler
collective action
common pool resource
fish stocking
fishery
lake association
open access
polycentric governance
social-ecological system
url https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol26/iss2/art16/
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AT bretttvanpoorten investinginthecommonstransientwelfarecreatesincentivesdespiteopenaccess
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