Investing in the commons: transient welfare creates incentives despite open access
Local users may invest in managing common pool resources, thereby promoting social and ecological resilience. Institutional or economic limits on access are regarded as essential preconditions for incentivizing local investments, but we show that investment incentives can exist even under open acces...
Main Authors: | , , , , , |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Resilience Alliance
2021-06-01
|
Series: | Ecology and Society |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol26/iss2/art16/ |
_version_ | 1818651654519521280 |
---|---|
author | Jacob P. Ziegler Sunny L. Jardine Stuart E. Jones Brett T. van Poorten Marco A. Janssen Christopher T. Solomon |
author_facet | Jacob P. Ziegler Sunny L. Jardine Stuart E. Jones Brett T. van Poorten Marco A. Janssen Christopher T. Solomon |
author_sort | Jacob P. Ziegler |
collection | DOAJ |
description | Local users may invest in managing common pool resources, thereby promoting social and ecological resilience. Institutional or economic limits on access are regarded as essential preconditions for incentivizing local investments, but we show that investment incentives can exist even under open access. We modeled a recreational harvest fishery in which local or centralized managers invest in fish stocking to maximize social welfare. Although classic open access dissipation of rents occurs at equilibrium, the sluggish response of fishing effort to changing conditions allows welfare to accrue in transition to equilibrium. This transient welfare creates persistent incentives to invest. Empirical observations showed that stocking by local collective action groups occurred at rates similar to model-predicted optima, while centralized stocking occurred at rates greater than predicted optima. Our results emphasize the potential benefits of local involvement in managing the commons, even under conditions that were previously thought to preclude effective collective action. |
first_indexed | 2024-12-17T02:09:33Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-396cb96855614c47be735b635a6f82a1 |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 1708-3087 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-12-17T02:09:33Z |
publishDate | 2021-06-01 |
publisher | Resilience Alliance |
record_format | Article |
series | Ecology and Society |
spelling | doaj.art-396cb96855614c47be735b635a6f82a12022-12-21T22:07:35ZengResilience AllianceEcology and Society1708-30872021-06-012621610.5751/ES-12339-26021612339Investing in the commons: transient welfare creates incentives despite open accessJacob P. Ziegler0Sunny L. Jardine1Stuart E. Jones2Brett T. van Poorten3Marco A. Janssen4Christopher T. Solomon5Department of Natural Resource Sciences, McGill UniversitySchool of Marine and Environmental Affairs, University of WashingtonDepartment of Biological Sciences, University of Notre DameSimon Fraser UniversitySchool of Sustainability, Arizona State UniversityCary Institute of Ecosystem StudiesLocal users may invest in managing common pool resources, thereby promoting social and ecological resilience. Institutional or economic limits on access are regarded as essential preconditions for incentivizing local investments, but we show that investment incentives can exist even under open access. We modeled a recreational harvest fishery in which local or centralized managers invest in fish stocking to maximize social welfare. Although classic open access dissipation of rents occurs at equilibrium, the sluggish response of fishing effort to changing conditions allows welfare to accrue in transition to equilibrium. This transient welfare creates persistent incentives to invest. Empirical observations showed that stocking by local collective action groups occurred at rates similar to model-predicted optima, while centralized stocking occurred at rates greater than predicted optima. Our results emphasize the potential benefits of local involvement in managing the commons, even under conditions that were previously thought to preclude effective collective action.https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol26/iss2/art16/anglercollective actioncommon pool resourcefish stockingfisherylake associationopen accesspolycentric governancesocial-ecological system |
spellingShingle | Jacob P. Ziegler Sunny L. Jardine Stuart E. Jones Brett T. van Poorten Marco A. Janssen Christopher T. Solomon Investing in the commons: transient welfare creates incentives despite open access Ecology and Society angler collective action common pool resource fish stocking fishery lake association open access polycentric governance social-ecological system |
title | Investing in the commons: transient welfare creates incentives despite open access |
title_full | Investing in the commons: transient welfare creates incentives despite open access |
title_fullStr | Investing in the commons: transient welfare creates incentives despite open access |
title_full_unstemmed | Investing in the commons: transient welfare creates incentives despite open access |
title_short | Investing in the commons: transient welfare creates incentives despite open access |
title_sort | investing in the commons transient welfare creates incentives despite open access |
topic | angler collective action common pool resource fish stocking fishery lake association open access polycentric governance social-ecological system |
url | https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol26/iss2/art16/ |
work_keys_str_mv | AT jacobpziegler investinginthecommonstransientwelfarecreatesincentivesdespiteopenaccess AT sunnyljardine investinginthecommonstransientwelfarecreatesincentivesdespiteopenaccess AT stuartejones investinginthecommonstransientwelfarecreatesincentivesdespiteopenaccess AT bretttvanpoorten investinginthecommonstransientwelfarecreatesincentivesdespiteopenaccess AT marcoajanssen investinginthecommonstransientwelfarecreatesincentivesdespiteopenaccess AT christophertsolomon investinginthecommonstransientwelfarecreatesincentivesdespiteopenaccess |