Comparative Fiscal Federalism and the Post‐Covid EU: Between Debt Rules and Borrowing Power

This thematic issue examines two main research questions: What are the features, the determinants, and the implications of fiscal integration in a system of multilevel governance like the EU? And, what can the post-pandemic EU learn from established federations when it comes to fiscal integration? W...

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Main Authors: Tomasz P. Woźniakowski, Tiziano Zgaga, Sergio Fabbrini
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Cogitatio 2023-10-01
Series:Politics and Governance
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/7653
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author Tomasz P. Woźniakowski
Tiziano Zgaga
Sergio Fabbrini
author_facet Tomasz P. Woźniakowski
Tiziano Zgaga
Sergio Fabbrini
author_sort Tomasz P. Woźniakowski
collection DOAJ
description This thematic issue examines two main research questions: What are the features, the determinants, and the implications of fiscal integration in a system of multilevel governance like the EU? And, what can the post-pandemic EU learn from established federations when it comes to fiscal integration? We attempt to conceptualize the patterns of EU fiscal integration. In so doing, we identify eight instruments of fiscal integration in a federal or multilevel polity, equally divided between fiscal capacity and fiscal regulation, depending on the side of the budget and the mode of integration (autonomous or dependent). For instance, as part of the fiscal capacity instrument of integration, we propose to distinguish between revenue and expenditure capacity. Revenue capacity is then further divided into tax capacity, based on EU/federal taxes, and budgetary capacity, based on non-independent sources, for instance, contributions from the member states. Expenditure capacity is divided into autonomous spending capacity, meaning direct spending by the EU, and a dependent transfer capacity, where the EU merely distributes resources (both grants and loans) to the member states.
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spelling doaj.art-397454216e4648adab402d3fe29a181f2023-10-27T09:46:55ZengCogitatioPolitics and Governance2183-24632023-10-011141510.17645/pag.v11i4.76533270Comparative Fiscal Federalism and the Post‐Covid EU: Between Debt Rules and Borrowing PowerTomasz P. Woźniakowski0Tiziano Zgaga1Sergio Fabbrini2Department of Political Science, LUISS University, Italy / Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Wrocław, PolandDepartment of Politics and Public Administration, University of Konstanz, GermanyDepartment of Political Science, LUISS University, ItalyThis thematic issue examines two main research questions: What are the features, the determinants, and the implications of fiscal integration in a system of multilevel governance like the EU? And, what can the post-pandemic EU learn from established federations when it comes to fiscal integration? We attempt to conceptualize the patterns of EU fiscal integration. In so doing, we identify eight instruments of fiscal integration in a federal or multilevel polity, equally divided between fiscal capacity and fiscal regulation, depending on the side of the budget and the mode of integration (autonomous or dependent). For instance, as part of the fiscal capacity instrument of integration, we propose to distinguish between revenue and expenditure capacity. Revenue capacity is then further divided into tax capacity, based on EU/federal taxes, and budgetary capacity, based on non-independent sources, for instance, contributions from the member states. Expenditure capacity is divided into autonomous spending capacity, meaning direct spending by the EU, and a dependent transfer capacity, where the EU merely distributes resources (both grants and loans) to the member states.https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/7653economic governanceeu budgeteu taxesfiscal capacityfiscal integrationfiscal solidarityfiscal unionfiscalization processnext generation euown resources
spellingShingle Tomasz P. Woźniakowski
Tiziano Zgaga
Sergio Fabbrini
Comparative Fiscal Federalism and the Post‐Covid EU: Between Debt Rules and Borrowing Power
Politics and Governance
economic governance
eu budget
eu taxes
fiscal capacity
fiscal integration
fiscal solidarity
fiscal union
fiscalization process
next generation eu
own resources
title Comparative Fiscal Federalism and the Post‐Covid EU: Between Debt Rules and Borrowing Power
title_full Comparative Fiscal Federalism and the Post‐Covid EU: Between Debt Rules and Borrowing Power
title_fullStr Comparative Fiscal Federalism and the Post‐Covid EU: Between Debt Rules and Borrowing Power
title_full_unstemmed Comparative Fiscal Federalism and the Post‐Covid EU: Between Debt Rules and Borrowing Power
title_short Comparative Fiscal Federalism and the Post‐Covid EU: Between Debt Rules and Borrowing Power
title_sort comparative fiscal federalism and the post covid eu between debt rules and borrowing power
topic economic governance
eu budget
eu taxes
fiscal capacity
fiscal integration
fiscal solidarity
fiscal union
fiscalization process
next generation eu
own resources
url https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/7653
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AT tizianozgaga comparativefiscalfederalismandthepostcovideubetweendebtrulesandborrowingpower
AT sergiofabbrini comparativefiscalfederalismandthepostcovideubetweendebtrulesandborrowingpower