Welfare–Balanced International Trade Agreements
In this work, we consider a classic international trade model with two countries and one firm in each country. The game has two stages: in the first stage, the governments of each country use their welfare functions to choose their tariffs either: (a) competitively (Nash equilibrium) or (b) cooperat...
Main Authors: | Filipe Martins, Alberto A. Pinto, Jorge P. Zubelli |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
MDPI AG
2022-12-01
|
Series: | Mathematics |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/11/1/40 |
Similar Items
-
Theory of international trade/
by: 369467 Hindley, Brian
Published: ([197) -
A new dataset on product-level trade elasticities
by: Lionel Fontagné, et al.
Published: (2022-12-01) -
How to measure protectionism in international trade in XXI century? The regional barometer of protectionism – case of Poland
by: Agnieszka Piekutowska, et al.
Published: (2023-04-01) -
Italy’s tariff agreements at Torquay
by: S. PARBONI
Published: (2014-09-01) -
A Conjectured Cournot Duopoly Model for the EU–US Automobile Trade: A Game Theoretic Analysis of the TTIP’s Most Traded Product
by: Eszter Kovács
Published: (2021-11-01)