Group Cooperation without Group Selection: Modest Punishment Can Recruit Much Cooperation.
Humans everywhere cooperate in groups to achieve benefits not attainable by individuals. Individual effort is often not automatically tied to a proportionate share of group benefits. This decoupling allows for free-riding, a strategy that (absent countermeasures) outcompetes cooperation. Empirically...
Main Authors: | Max M Krasnow, Andrew W Delton, Leda Cosmides, John Tooby |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Public Library of Science (PLoS)
2015-01-01
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Series: | PLoS ONE |
Online Access: | http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC4404356?pdf=render |
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