| Summary: | Based on the cross-sectional data about the municipal Party committee
secretaries sacked since the 18th CPC National Congress, this paper adopts a
regression model to examine and assess the impact of local top Party leaders’
corruption. The study discovers that local heads’ integrity directly affects
local political ecology they are in; that regions in the charge of corruptive
heads suffer a higher degree of corruption; and that the tenure of corruptive
local heads relates much to the degree of local corruption (i.e. the longer their
tenure is, the more baneful influence they exert on the clean governance
of local leaders and cadres). Consequently, it is imperative to establish and
consolidate a power structure and a corresponding operating mechanism
which enable effective mutual constraint and balance among decisionmaking power, executive power and supervision power. Only by doing so
can China alleviate the negative impact of local heads’ corruption, effectively
restrict and supervise local heads’ exercise of power, and maintain a well
balance between “power delegation” and “power supervision”.
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