| Summary: | The present study
investigates how group-cooperation heuristics boost voluntary contributions in
a repeated public goods game. We manipulate two separate factors in a
two-person public goods game: i) group composition (Selfish Subjects vs.
Conditional Cooperators) and ii) common knowledge about group composition
(Information vs. No Information). In addition, we let the subjects signal
expectations of the other’s contributions in the experiment's second phase.
Common knowledge of Selfish type alone slightly dampens contributions but
dramatically increases contributions when signaling of expectations is allowed.
The results suggest that group-cooperation heuristics are triggered when two
factors are jointly salient to the agent: (i) that there is no one to free-ride
on; and (ii) that the other wants to cooperate because of (i). We highlight the
potential effectiveness of group-cooperation heuristics and propose solution
thinking as the schema of reasoning underlying the heuristics. The high
correlation between expectations and actual contributions is compatible with
the existence of default preference to satisfy others’ expectations (or to
avoid disappointing them), but the stark end-game effect suggests that
group-cooperation heuristics, at least among selfish players, function
ultimately to benefit material self-interest rather than to just please
others.
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