Making good cider out of bad apples --- Signaling expectations boosts cooperation among would-be free riders
The present study investigates how group-cooperation heuristics boost voluntary contributions in a repeated public goods game. We manipulate two separate factors in a two-person public goods game: i) group composition (Selfish Subjects vs. Conditional Cooperators) and ii) common knowledge about grou...
| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge University Press
2018-01-01
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| Series: | Judgment and Decision Making |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://journal.sjdm.org/16/161219/jdm161219.pdf |
| _version_ | 1797717458375671808 |
|---|---|
| author | Michiru Nagatsu Karen Larsen Mia Karabegovic Marcell Székely Dan Mønster John Michael |
| author_facet | Michiru Nagatsu Karen Larsen Mia Karabegovic Marcell Székely Dan Mønster John Michael |
| author_sort | Michiru Nagatsu |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The present study
investigates how group-cooperation heuristics boost voluntary contributions in
a repeated public goods game. We manipulate two separate factors in a
two-person public goods game: i) group composition (Selfish Subjects vs.
Conditional Cooperators) and ii) common knowledge about group composition
(Information vs. No Information). In addition, we let the subjects signal
expectations of the other’s contributions in the experiment's second phase.
Common knowledge of Selfish type alone slightly dampens contributions but
dramatically increases contributions when signaling of expectations is allowed.
The results suggest that group-cooperation heuristics are triggered when two
factors are jointly salient to the agent: (i) that there is no one to free-ride
on; and (ii) that the other wants to cooperate because of (i). We highlight the
potential effectiveness of group-cooperation heuristics and propose solution
thinking as the schema of reasoning underlying the heuristics. The high
correlation between expectations and actual contributions is compatible with
the existence of default preference to satisfy others’ expectations (or to
avoid disappointing them), but the stark end-game effect suggests that
group-cooperation heuristics, at least among selfish players, function
ultimately to benefit material self-interest rather than to just please
others. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-12T08:37:34Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-3cd6272dd9eb4aa8b0a8b0bbb103bfb8 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1930-2975 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-12T08:37:34Z |
| publishDate | 2018-01-01 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Judgment and Decision Making |
| spelling | doaj.art-3cd6272dd9eb4aa8b0a8b0bbb103bfb82023-09-02T17:08:30ZengCambridge University PressJudgment and Decision Making1930-29752018-01-01131137149Making good cider out of bad apples --- Signaling expectations boosts cooperation among would-be free ridersMichiru NagatsuKaren LarsenMia KarabegovicMarcell SzékelyDan MønsterJohn MichaelThe present study investigates how group-cooperation heuristics boost voluntary contributions in a repeated public goods game. We manipulate two separate factors in a two-person public goods game: i) group composition (Selfish Subjects vs. Conditional Cooperators) and ii) common knowledge about group composition (Information vs. No Information). In addition, we let the subjects signal expectations of the other’s contributions in the experiment's second phase. Common knowledge of Selfish type alone slightly dampens contributions but dramatically increases contributions when signaling of expectations is allowed. The results suggest that group-cooperation heuristics are triggered when two factors are jointly salient to the agent: (i) that there is no one to free-ride on; and (ii) that the other wants to cooperate because of (i). We highlight the potential effectiveness of group-cooperation heuristics and propose solution thinking as the schema of reasoning underlying the heuristics. The high correlation between expectations and actual contributions is compatible with the existence of default preference to satisfy others’ expectations (or to avoid disappointing them), but the stark end-game effect suggests that group-cooperation heuristics, at least among selfish players, function ultimately to benefit material self-interest rather than to just please others.http://journal.sjdm.org/16/161219/jdm161219.pdfgroup-cooperation heuristics public goods group composition expectations solution thinkingNAKeywords |
| spellingShingle | Michiru Nagatsu Karen Larsen Mia Karabegovic Marcell Székely Dan Mønster John Michael Making good cider out of bad apples --- Signaling expectations boosts cooperation among would-be free riders Judgment and Decision Making group-cooperation heuristics public goods group composition expectations solution thinkingNAKeywords |
| title | Making good cider
out of bad apples --- Signaling expectations boosts cooperation among would-be
free riders |
| title_full | Making good cider
out of bad apples --- Signaling expectations boosts cooperation among would-be
free riders |
| title_fullStr | Making good cider
out of bad apples --- Signaling expectations boosts cooperation among would-be
free riders |
| title_full_unstemmed | Making good cider
out of bad apples --- Signaling expectations boosts cooperation among would-be
free riders |
| title_short | Making good cider
out of bad apples --- Signaling expectations boosts cooperation among would-be
free riders |
| title_sort | making good cider out of bad apples signaling expectations boosts cooperation among would be free riders |
| topic | group-cooperation heuristics public goods group composition expectations solution thinkingNAKeywords |
| url | http://journal.sjdm.org/16/161219/jdm161219.pdf |
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