Securing the Insecure: A First-Line-of-Defense for Body-Centric Nanoscale Communication Systems Operating in THz Band
This manuscript presents a novel mechanism (at the physical layer) for authentication and transmitter identification in a body-centric nanoscale communication system operating in the terahertz (THz) band. The unique characteristics of the propagation medium in the THz band renders the existing techn...
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| Format: | Article |
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MDPI AG
2021-05-01
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| Series: | Sensors |
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| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/21/10/3534 |
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| author | Waqas Aman Muhammad Mahboob Ur Rahman Hasan T. Abbas Muhammad Arslan Khalid Muhammad A. Imran Akram Alomainy Qammer H. Abbasi |
| author_facet | Waqas Aman Muhammad Mahboob Ur Rahman Hasan T. Abbas Muhammad Arslan Khalid Muhammad A. Imran Akram Alomainy Qammer H. Abbasi |
| author_sort | Waqas Aman |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | This manuscript presents a novel mechanism (at the physical layer) for authentication and transmitter identification in a body-centric nanoscale communication system operating in the terahertz (THz) band. The unique characteristics of the propagation medium in the THz band renders the existing techniques (say for impersonation detection in cellular networks) not applicable. In this work, we considered a body-centric network with multiple on-body nano-senor nodes (of which some nano-sensors have been compromised) who communicate their sensed data to a nearby gateway node. We proposed to protect the transmissions on the link between the legitimate nano-sensor nodes and the gateway by exploiting the path loss of the THz propagation medium as the fingerprint/feature of the sender node to carry out authentication at the gateway. Specifically, we proposed a two-step hypothesis testing mechanism at the gateway to counter the impersonation (false data injection) attacks by malicious nano-sensors. To this end, we computed the path loss of the THz link under consideration using the high-resolution transmission molecular absorption (HITRAN) database. Furthermore, to refine the outcome of the two-step hypothesis testing device, we modeled the impersonation attack detection problem as a hidden Markov model (HMM), which was then solved by the classical Viterbi algorithm. As a bye-product of the authentication problem, we performed transmitter identification (when the two-step hypothesis testing device decides no impersonation) using (i) the maximum likelihood (ML) method and (ii) the Gaussian mixture model (GMM), whose parameters are learned via the expectation–maximization algorithm. Our simulation results showed that the two error probabilities (missed detection and false alarm) were decreasing functions of the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Specifically, at an SNR of 10 dB with a pre-specified false alarm rate of <inline-formula><math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline"><semantics><mrow><mn>0.2</mn></mrow></semantics></math></inline-formula>, the probability of correct detection was almost one. We further noticed that the HMM method outperformed the two-step hypothesis testing method at low SNRs (e.g., a <inline-formula><math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline"><semantics><mrow><mn>10</mn><mo>%</mo></mrow></semantics></math></inline-formula> increase in accuracy was recorded at SNR = −5 dB), as expected. Finally, it was observed that the GMM method was useful when the ground truths (the true path loss values for all the legitimate THz links) were noisy. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-10T11:15:59Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-3dcfa2e9d5c34adeb8724c9860b21bec |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1424-8220 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-10T11:15:59Z |
| publishDate | 2021-05-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Sensors |
| spelling | doaj.art-3dcfa2e9d5c34adeb8724c9860b21bec2023-11-21T20:24:18ZengMDPI AGSensors1424-82202021-05-012110353410.3390/s21103534Securing the Insecure: A First-Line-of-Defense for Body-Centric Nanoscale Communication Systems Operating in THz BandWaqas Aman0Muhammad Mahboob Ur Rahman1Hasan T. Abbas2Muhammad Arslan Khalid3Muhammad A. Imran4Akram Alomainy5Qammer H. Abbasi6Electrical Engineering Department, Information Technology University, Lahore 54000, PakistanElectrical Engineering Department, Information Technology University, Lahore 54000, PakistanDepartment of Electronics and Nano Engineering, University of Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8QQ, UKDivision of Biomedical Engineering, School of Engineering, University of Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8QQ, UKDepartment of Electronics and Nano Engineering, University of Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8QQ, UKSchool of Electronic Engineering and Computer Science, Queen Mary University of London, London E1 4NS, UKDepartment of Electronics and Nano Engineering, University of Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8QQ, UKThis manuscript presents a novel mechanism (at the physical layer) for authentication and transmitter identification in a body-centric nanoscale communication system operating in the terahertz (THz) band. The unique characteristics of the propagation medium in the THz band renders the existing techniques (say for impersonation detection in cellular networks) not applicable. In this work, we considered a body-centric network with multiple on-body nano-senor nodes (of which some nano-sensors have been compromised) who communicate their sensed data to a nearby gateway node. We proposed to protect the transmissions on the link between the legitimate nano-sensor nodes and the gateway by exploiting the path loss of the THz propagation medium as the fingerprint/feature of the sender node to carry out authentication at the gateway. Specifically, we proposed a two-step hypothesis testing mechanism at the gateway to counter the impersonation (false data injection) attacks by malicious nano-sensors. To this end, we computed the path loss of the THz link under consideration using the high-resolution transmission molecular absorption (HITRAN) database. Furthermore, to refine the outcome of the two-step hypothesis testing device, we modeled the impersonation attack detection problem as a hidden Markov model (HMM), which was then solved by the classical Viterbi algorithm. As a bye-product of the authentication problem, we performed transmitter identification (when the two-step hypothesis testing device decides no impersonation) using (i) the maximum likelihood (ML) method and (ii) the Gaussian mixture model (GMM), whose parameters are learned via the expectation–maximization algorithm. Our simulation results showed that the two error probabilities (missed detection and false alarm) were decreasing functions of the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Specifically, at an SNR of 10 dB with a pre-specified false alarm rate of <inline-formula><math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline"><semantics><mrow><mn>0.2</mn></mrow></semantics></math></inline-formula>, the probability of correct detection was almost one. We further noticed that the HMM method outperformed the two-step hypothesis testing method at low SNRs (e.g., a <inline-formula><math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline"><semantics><mrow><mn>10</mn><mo>%</mo></mrow></semantics></math></inline-formula> increase in accuracy was recorded at SNR = −5 dB), as expected. Finally, it was observed that the GMM method was useful when the ground truths (the true path loss values for all the legitimate THz links) were noisy.https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/21/10/3534body-centric sensor networksnanoscale communicationterahertz communicationnano sensorssecurityauthentication |
| spellingShingle | Waqas Aman Muhammad Mahboob Ur Rahman Hasan T. Abbas Muhammad Arslan Khalid Muhammad A. Imran Akram Alomainy Qammer H. Abbasi Securing the Insecure: A First-Line-of-Defense for Body-Centric Nanoscale Communication Systems Operating in THz Band Sensors body-centric sensor networks nanoscale communication terahertz communication nano sensors security authentication |
| title | Securing the Insecure: A First-Line-of-Defense for Body-Centric Nanoscale Communication Systems Operating in THz Band |
| title_full | Securing the Insecure: A First-Line-of-Defense for Body-Centric Nanoscale Communication Systems Operating in THz Band |
| title_fullStr | Securing the Insecure: A First-Line-of-Defense for Body-Centric Nanoscale Communication Systems Operating in THz Band |
| title_full_unstemmed | Securing the Insecure: A First-Line-of-Defense for Body-Centric Nanoscale Communication Systems Operating in THz Band |
| title_short | Securing the Insecure: A First-Line-of-Defense for Body-Centric Nanoscale Communication Systems Operating in THz Band |
| title_sort | securing the insecure a first line of defense for body centric nanoscale communication systems operating in thz band |
| topic | body-centric sensor networks nanoscale communication terahertz communication nano sensors security authentication |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/21/10/3534 |
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