Leibniz on Corporeal Substance
As an idealist, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz could not recognize anything corporeal as substantial. However, under the influence of Cartesian terminology, he devoted considerable effort to analysing the corporeal world, while not recognizing its real substantiality of course. Leibniz took the concept...
Main Author: | Peeter Müürsepp |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Estonian Association of the History and Philosophy of Science
2016-10-01
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Series: | Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://www.bahps.org/02_Muursepp-2016-2-02.pdf |
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