The Problem of the First Belief: Group Agents and Responsibility
Attributing moral responsibility to an agent requires that the agent is a capable member of a moral community. Capable members of a moral community are often thought of as moral reasoners (or moral persons) and, thus, to attribute moral responsibility to collective agents would require showing that...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University of Vienna
2022-03-01
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| Series: | Journal of Social Ontology |
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| Online Access: | https://journalofsocialontology.org/index.php/jso/article/view/6746 |
| _version_ | 1797818270057758720 |
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| author | Onni Hirvonen |
| author_facet | Onni Hirvonen |
| author_sort | Onni Hirvonen |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description |
Attributing moral responsibility to an agent requires that the agent is a capable member of a moral community. Capable members of a moral community are often thought of as moral reasoners (or moral persons) and, thus, to attribute moral responsibility to collective agents would require showing that they are capable of moral reasoning. It is argued here that those theories that understand collective reasoning and collective moral agency in terms of collective decision-making and commitment – as is arguably the case with Christian List and Philip Pettit’s theory of group agency – face the so-called “problem of the first belief” that threatens to make moral reasoning impossible for group agents. This paper introduces three possible solutions to the problem and discusses the effects that these solutions have in regard to the possibility of attributing moral responsibility to groups.
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| first_indexed | 2024-03-13T09:05:36Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-3dea18574c6a4be0aba9a6dd2c4df056 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2196-9663 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-13T09:05:36Z |
| publishDate | 2022-03-01 |
| publisher | University of Vienna |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Journal of Social Ontology |
| spelling | doaj.art-3dea18574c6a4be0aba9a6dd2c4df0562023-05-28T07:32:12ZengUniversity of ViennaJournal of Social Ontology2196-96632022-03-0161The Problem of the First Belief: Group Agents and ResponsibilityOnni Hirvonen0University of Jyväskylä Attributing moral responsibility to an agent requires that the agent is a capable member of a moral community. Capable members of a moral community are often thought of as moral reasoners (or moral persons) and, thus, to attribute moral responsibility to collective agents would require showing that they are capable of moral reasoning. It is argued here that those theories that understand collective reasoning and collective moral agency in terms of collective decision-making and commitment – as is arguably the case with Christian List and Philip Pettit’s theory of group agency – face the so-called “problem of the first belief” that threatens to make moral reasoning impossible for group agents. This paper introduces three possible solutions to the problem and discusses the effects that these solutions have in regard to the possibility of attributing moral responsibility to groups. https://journalofsocialontology.org/index.php/jso/article/view/6746Christian Listcollective beliefscollective responsibilitygroup agencymoral personhoodPhilip Pettit |
| spellingShingle | Onni Hirvonen The Problem of the First Belief: Group Agents and Responsibility Journal of Social Ontology Christian List collective beliefs collective responsibility group agency moral personhood Philip Pettit |
| title | The Problem of the First Belief: Group Agents and Responsibility |
| title_full | The Problem of the First Belief: Group Agents and Responsibility |
| title_fullStr | The Problem of the First Belief: Group Agents and Responsibility |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Problem of the First Belief: Group Agents and Responsibility |
| title_short | The Problem of the First Belief: Group Agents and Responsibility |
| title_sort | problem of the first belief group agents and responsibility |
| topic | Christian List collective beliefs collective responsibility group agency moral personhood Philip Pettit |
| url | https://journalofsocialontology.org/index.php/jso/article/view/6746 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT onnihirvonen theproblemofthefirstbeliefgroupagentsandresponsibility AT onnihirvonen problemofthefirstbeliefgroupagentsandresponsibility |