Price reaction to rights issue announcements of family firms

This study examines the effect of family control on the price reaction to rights issue announcements of publicly listed firms in Indonesia during the period of 2005–2018. The study uses agency theory, which discusses the conflict of interest between controlling/majority and non-controlling/minority...

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Main Authors: Lukas Setia-Atmaja, Henry Suthiono
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: LLC "CPC "Business Perspectives" 2022-06-01
Series:Investment Management & Financial Innovations
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.businessperspectives.org/images/pdf/applications/publishing/templates/article/assets/16602/IMFI_2022_02_Setia-Atmaja.pdf
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author Lukas Setia-Atmaja
Henry Suthiono
author_facet Lukas Setia-Atmaja
Henry Suthiono
author_sort Lukas Setia-Atmaja
collection DOAJ
description This study examines the effect of family control on the price reaction to rights issue announcements of publicly listed firms in Indonesia during the period of 2005–2018. The study uses agency theory, which discusses the conflict of interest between controlling/majority and non-controlling/minority shareholders. The results show that the price reaction to the right issue announcements for publicly listed firms in Indonesia is statistically significantly negative. The mean of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) falls between –1.40% (for the Day 0 window period) and –3,43% (for the –5 to +5 window period). Further examination indicates that family control is associated with a more negative price reaction to these rights issue announcements. Specifically, for rights issue announcements of family firms, the mean cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) fall between –1,98% at announcement day (Day 0) and –5,23% for the event window period (–5 to +5). Meanwhile, for rights issue announcements of non-family firms, the current study found statistically insignificant price reactions to rights issue announcements for all the event window periods. These findings suggest that investors perceive higher agency problems among family firms where the family controlling shareholders tend to misuse and tunnel the rights issue funds for their own private benefit.
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spelling doaj.art-3fe9e8ee86fc4195a7266cd94ec5f13c2022-12-22T03:06:55ZengLLC "CPC "Business Perspectives"Investment Management & Financial Innovations1810-49671812-93582022-06-0119222122910.21511/imfi.19(2).2022.1916602Price reaction to rights issue announcements of family firmsLukas Setia-Atmaja0https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5380-0544Henry Suthiono1https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0065-8067Ph.D., Associate Professor, School of Business and Economics, Universitas Prasetiya MulyaMaster/Lecturer, School of Business and Economics, Universitas Prasetiya MulyaThis study examines the effect of family control on the price reaction to rights issue announcements of publicly listed firms in Indonesia during the period of 2005–2018. The study uses agency theory, which discusses the conflict of interest between controlling/majority and non-controlling/minority shareholders. The results show that the price reaction to the right issue announcements for publicly listed firms in Indonesia is statistically significantly negative. The mean of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) falls between –1.40% (for the Day 0 window period) and –3,43% (for the –5 to +5 window period). Further examination indicates that family control is associated with a more negative price reaction to these rights issue announcements. Specifically, for rights issue announcements of family firms, the mean cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) fall between –1,98% at announcement day (Day 0) and –5,23% for the event window period (–5 to +5). Meanwhile, for rights issue announcements of non-family firms, the current study found statistically insignificant price reactions to rights issue announcements for all the event window periods. These findings suggest that investors perceive higher agency problems among family firms where the family controlling shareholders tend to misuse and tunnel the rights issue funds for their own private benefit.https://www.businessperspectives.org/images/pdf/applications/publishing/templates/article/assets/16602/IMFI_2022_02_Setia-Atmaja.pdfagency theoryfamily firmsprice reactionrights issue announcementstunneling
spellingShingle Lukas Setia-Atmaja
Henry Suthiono
Price reaction to rights issue announcements of family firms
Investment Management & Financial Innovations
agency theory
family firms
price reaction
rights issue announcements
tunneling
title Price reaction to rights issue announcements of family firms
title_full Price reaction to rights issue announcements of family firms
title_fullStr Price reaction to rights issue announcements of family firms
title_full_unstemmed Price reaction to rights issue announcements of family firms
title_short Price reaction to rights issue announcements of family firms
title_sort price reaction to rights issue announcements of family firms
topic agency theory
family firms
price reaction
rights issue announcements
tunneling
url https://www.businessperspectives.org/images/pdf/applications/publishing/templates/article/assets/16602/IMFI_2022_02_Setia-Atmaja.pdf
work_keys_str_mv AT lukassetiaatmaja pricereactiontorightsissueannouncementsoffamilyfirms
AT henrysuthiono pricereactiontorightsissueannouncementsoffamilyfirms