Analytic atheism: A cross-culturally weak and fickle phenomenon?

Religious belief is a topic of longstanding interest to psychological science, but the psychology of religious disbelief is a relative newcomer. One prominently discussed model is analytic atheism, wherein cognitive reflection, as measured with the Cognitive Reflection Test, overrides religious intu...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Will M. Gervais, Michiel van Elk, Dimitris Xygalatas, Ryan T. McKay, Mark Aveyard, Emma E. Buchtel, Ilan Dar-Nimrod, Eva Kundtová Klocová, Jonathan E. Ramsay, Tapani Riekki, Annika M. Svedholm-Häkkinen, Joseph Bulbulia
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Cambridge University Press 2018-05-01
Series:Judgment and Decision Making
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Online Access:http://journal.sjdm.org/18/18228/jdm18228.pdf
Description
Summary:Religious belief is a topic of longstanding interest to psychological science, but the psychology of religious disbelief is a relative newcomer. One prominently discussed model is analytic atheism, wherein cognitive reflection, as measured with the Cognitive Reflection Test, overrides religious intuitions and instruction. Consistent with this model, performance-based measures of cognitive reflection predict religious disbelief in WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) samples. However, the generality of analytic atheism remains unknown. Drawing on a large global sample (N = 3461) from 13 religiously, demographically, and culturally diverse societies, we find that analytic atheism as usually assessed is in fact quite fickle cross-culturally, appearing robustly ony in aggregate analyses and in three individual countries. The results provide additional evidence for culture’s effects on core beliefs.
ISSN:1930-2975