Deflationism, Truth-Aptness and Non-Factualism
I will argue that the standard formulation of non-factualism in terms of a denial of truth-aptness is consistent with a version of deflationsim. My line of argument assumes the use conception of meaning. This brings out an interesting consequence since mostly the philosophers who endorse the use con...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
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University of Tartu
2008-08-01
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| Series: | Studia Philosophica Estonica |
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| Online Access: | http://www.spe.ut.ee/ojs/index.php/spe/article/download/9/4 |
| _version_ | 1819057043157286912 |
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| author | Massimiliano Vignolo |
| author_facet | Massimiliano Vignolo |
| author_sort | Massimiliano Vignolo |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | I will argue that the standard formulation of non-factualism in terms of a denial of truth-aptness is consistent with a version of deflationsim. My line of argument assumes the use conception of meaning. This brings out an interesting consequence since mostly the philosophers who endorse the use conception of meaning, e.g. Paul Horwich, hold that deflationism is inconsistent with the strategy of implementing non-factualism in terms of a denial of truth-aptness and thereby urge a reformulation of non-factualism. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-21T13:33:02Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-404c63e3cbbc4f3c81ac726f2b700c24 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1406-0000 1736-5899 |
| language | deu |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-21T13:33:02Z |
| publishDate | 2008-08-01 |
| publisher | University of Tartu |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Studia Philosophica Estonica |
| spelling | doaj.art-404c63e3cbbc4f3c81ac726f2b700c242022-12-21T19:02:15ZdeuUniversity of TartuStudia Philosophica Estonica1406-00001736-58992008-08-011.184103Deflationism, Truth-Aptness and Non-FactualismMassimiliano VignoloI will argue that the standard formulation of non-factualism in terms of a denial of truth-aptness is consistent with a version of deflationsim. My line of argument assumes the use conception of meaning. This brings out an interesting consequence since mostly the philosophers who endorse the use conception of meaning, e.g. Paul Horwich, hold that deflationism is inconsistent with the strategy of implementing non-factualism in terms of a denial of truth-aptness and thereby urge a reformulation of non-factualism.http://www.spe.ut.ee/ojs/index.php/spe/article/download/9/4deflationismnon-factualismuse conception of meaning |
| spellingShingle | Massimiliano Vignolo Deflationism, Truth-Aptness and Non-Factualism Studia Philosophica Estonica deflationism non-factualism use conception of meaning |
| title | Deflationism, Truth-Aptness and Non-Factualism |
| title_full | Deflationism, Truth-Aptness and Non-Factualism |
| title_fullStr | Deflationism, Truth-Aptness and Non-Factualism |
| title_full_unstemmed | Deflationism, Truth-Aptness and Non-Factualism |
| title_short | Deflationism, Truth-Aptness and Non-Factualism |
| title_sort | deflationism truth aptness and non factualism |
| topic | deflationism non-factualism use conception of meaning |
| url | http://www.spe.ut.ee/ojs/index.php/spe/article/download/9/4 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT massimilianovignolo deflationismtruthaptnessandnonfactualism |