Analyzing cooperative game theory solutions: core and Shapley value in cartesian product of two sets
The core and the Shapley value stand out as the most renowned solutions for addressing sharing problems in cooperative game theory. These concepts are widely acknowledged for their effectiveness in tackling negotiation, resource allocation, and power dynamics. The present study aims to extend variou...
Main Authors: | Mekdad Slime, Mohammed El Kamli, Abdellah Ould Khal |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Frontiers Media S.A.
2024-04-01
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Series: | Frontiers in Applied Mathematics and Statistics |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fams.2024.1332352/full |
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