Common Ground, Conversational Roles and Epistemic Injustice

People partaking in a conversation can add to the common ground of said conversation by performing different speech acts. That is, they can influence which propositions are presumed to be shared among them. In this paper, I am going to apply the common ground framework to the phenomenon of epistemic...

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Main Author: Felix Bräuer
Format: Article
Language:ces
Published: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences 2021-05-01
Series:Organon F
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/05241240orgf.2021.28206.pdf
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author Felix Bräuer
author_facet Felix Bräuer
author_sort Felix Bräuer
collection DOAJ
description People partaking in a conversation can add to the common ground of said conversation by performing different speech acts. That is, they can influence which propositions are presumed to be shared among them. In this paper, I am going to apply the common ground framework to the phenomenon of epistemic injustice. In doing so, I am going to focus on two kinds of speech acts: making assertions and asking certain kinds of questions. And I am going to look at three varieties of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice, inquiring injus- tice and interpretative injustice. I am going to argue that what all these varieties of epistemic injustice have in common is that they unfairly inhibit the speaker’s ability to add to the common ground in the way intended by her. This in turn negatively affects which conversational roles a speaker can play in a given conversation. Based on these results, I am going to end by looking at some of the harms that epistemic injustice inflicts upon its victims.
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spelling doaj.art-40e92a5bb7e74d3b8c73d804a96798c12022-12-21T18:52:50ZcesInstitute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of SciencesOrganon F1335-06682585-71502021-05-01282399419https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28206Common Ground, Conversational Roles and Epistemic InjusticeFelix Bräuer0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2847-1037Universität MannheimPeople partaking in a conversation can add to the common ground of said conversation by performing different speech acts. That is, they can influence which propositions are presumed to be shared among them. In this paper, I am going to apply the common ground framework to the phenomenon of epistemic injustice. In doing so, I am going to focus on two kinds of speech acts: making assertions and asking certain kinds of questions. And I am going to look at three varieties of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice, inquiring injus- tice and interpretative injustice. I am going to argue that what all these varieties of epistemic injustice have in common is that they unfairly inhibit the speaker’s ability to add to the common ground in the way intended by her. This in turn negatively affects which conversational roles a speaker can play in a given conversation. Based on these results, I am going to end by looking at some of the harms that epistemic injustice inflicts upon its victims.https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/05241240orgf.2021.28206.pdfcommon groundconversational rolesconversation-typesepistemic injusticemiranda frickermitchell green
spellingShingle Felix Bräuer
Common Ground, Conversational Roles and Epistemic Injustice
Organon F
common ground
conversational roles
conversation-types
epistemic injustice
miranda fricker
mitchell green
title Common Ground, Conversational Roles and Epistemic Injustice
title_full Common Ground, Conversational Roles and Epistemic Injustice
title_fullStr Common Ground, Conversational Roles and Epistemic Injustice
title_full_unstemmed Common Ground, Conversational Roles and Epistemic Injustice
title_short Common Ground, Conversational Roles and Epistemic Injustice
title_sort common ground conversational roles and epistemic injustice
topic common ground
conversational roles
conversation-types
epistemic injustice
miranda fricker
mitchell green
url https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/05241240orgf.2021.28206.pdf
work_keys_str_mv AT felixbrauer commongroundconversationalrolesandepistemicinjustice