CEO confidence bias and strategic choice: a general framework
An owner of a firm may choose to hire an unbiased CEO or one with confidence bias. We develop a model that demonstrates that the owner’s optimal choice depends on whether the firm and rival choice variables are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. When choice variables are strategic subst...
Main Authors: | Elizabeth Schroeder, Carol Horton Tremblay, Victor J. Tremblay |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Taylor & Francis Group
2022-12-01
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Series: | Journal of Applied Economics |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/10.1080/15140326.2022.2053829 |
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