The Commonwealth of Poland towards Russia in the final stage of the Great Diet (1791–1792)
When the Constitution was ratified on May 3, 1791, establishing good relations with Russia was the most important issue for the security of the Commonwealth. As leaders of the Great Diet noticed that prosperous situation in the Polish-Lithuanian state’s international relations was ending, they sugge...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Lodz University Press
2017-08-01
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| Series: | Przegląd Nauk Historycznych |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://czasopisma.uni.lodz.pl/pnh/article/view/3072 |
| _version_ | 1811324975540338688 |
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| author | Zbigniew Anusik |
| author_facet | Zbigniew Anusik |
| author_sort | Zbigniew Anusik |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | When the Constitution was ratified on May 3, 1791, establishing good relations with Russia was the most important issue for the security of the Commonwealth. As leaders of the Great Diet noticed that prosperous situation in the Polish-Lithuanian state’s international relations was ending, they suggested Stanisław August to turn to Russia. Because of their initiative, the king introduced several members of the St. Petersburg court to the Guardians of the Laws. Yet, it did not reorient Polish foreign policy. Having strengthened his position, Stanisław August was delaying direct talks with the empress. He was convinced, that to avoid Russian intervention in the Commonwealth’s internal affairs, one should not provoke Russians and appease any internal conflicts. That assumption turned to be wrong, though. Contrary to the views of the vast majority of Polish historians, who believed that Russian intervention in Poland was predetermined, the St. Petersburg court was divided, when it came to the policy on the Polish-Lithuanian state. Some advisers of Catherine II believed, that without a final agreement with German courts, one should not start a war with the Commonwealth, because it would be hard, long-lasting and costly. Yet, views of Polish malcontents and empress’s favorite, Platon A. Zubov, were taken into account, and a military operation was launched, without looking at Vienna and Berlin’s position. A passive diplomacy turned out to be a fatal mistake of the Polish king and his advisers. The concept of a limited warfare was equally wrong. The weak resistance of the Polish army strengthened the position of the empress’s favorite. When Stanisław August’s letter to Catherine II arrived at St. Petersburg, already in the course of war, at the Russian court a group of war opponents took a final attempt to stop hostilities, and start negotiations with the Commonwealth’s ruler. However, successes of empress’s troops, that rapidly moved towards Warsaw after the withdrawing Poles, favored supporters of an armed intervention. The king and his advisers ceased to believe in the possibility of victory too soon, and capitulated at the time, when there was still a chance to continue the war, a prolongation of which by several weeks might have prompted the empress to start peace negotiations. It was a great political mistake, which turned out to be the beginning of the end of the First Republic. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-13T14:25:01Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-42b5d751ef094effa47cadf6f03c02ae |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1644-857X 2450-7660 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-13T14:25:01Z |
| publishDate | 2017-08-01 |
| publisher | Lodz University Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Przegląd Nauk Historycznych |
| spelling | doaj.art-42b5d751ef094effa47cadf6f03c02ae2022-12-22T02:43:21ZengLodz University PressPrzegląd Nauk Historycznych1644-857X2450-76602017-08-0116210.18778/1644-857X.16.02.032328The Commonwealth of Poland towards Russia in the final stage of the Great Diet (1791–1792)Zbigniew Anusik0Uniwersytet Łódzki, Wydział Filozoficzno-Historyczny, Instytut Historii, Katedra Historii NowożytnejWhen the Constitution was ratified on May 3, 1791, establishing good relations with Russia was the most important issue for the security of the Commonwealth. As leaders of the Great Diet noticed that prosperous situation in the Polish-Lithuanian state’s international relations was ending, they suggested Stanisław August to turn to Russia. Because of their initiative, the king introduced several members of the St. Petersburg court to the Guardians of the Laws. Yet, it did not reorient Polish foreign policy. Having strengthened his position, Stanisław August was delaying direct talks with the empress. He was convinced, that to avoid Russian intervention in the Commonwealth’s internal affairs, one should not provoke Russians and appease any internal conflicts. That assumption turned to be wrong, though. Contrary to the views of the vast majority of Polish historians, who believed that Russian intervention in Poland was predetermined, the St. Petersburg court was divided, when it came to the policy on the Polish-Lithuanian state. Some advisers of Catherine II believed, that without a final agreement with German courts, one should not start a war with the Commonwealth, because it would be hard, long-lasting and costly. Yet, views of Polish malcontents and empress’s favorite, Platon A. Zubov, were taken into account, and a military operation was launched, without looking at Vienna and Berlin’s position. A passive diplomacy turned out to be a fatal mistake of the Polish king and his advisers. The concept of a limited warfare was equally wrong. The weak resistance of the Polish army strengthened the position of the empress’s favorite. When Stanisław August’s letter to Catherine II arrived at St. Petersburg, already in the course of war, at the Russian court a group of war opponents took a final attempt to stop hostilities, and start negotiations with the Commonwealth’s ruler. However, successes of empress’s troops, that rapidly moved towards Warsaw after the withdrawing Poles, favored supporters of an armed intervention. The king and his advisers ceased to believe in the possibility of victory too soon, and capitulated at the time, when there was still a chance to continue the war, a prolongation of which by several weeks might have prompted the empress to start peace negotiations. It was a great political mistake, which turned out to be the beginning of the end of the First Republic.https://czasopisma.uni.lodz.pl/pnh/article/view/3072Sejm WielkiKonstytucja 3 majaStraż Prawpolityka zagraniczna Rzeczypospolitejstosunki polsko-rosyjskie w latach 1791–1792 |
| spellingShingle | Zbigniew Anusik The Commonwealth of Poland towards Russia in the final stage of the Great Diet (1791–1792) Przegląd Nauk Historycznych Sejm Wielki Konstytucja 3 maja Straż Praw polityka zagraniczna Rzeczypospolitej stosunki polsko-rosyjskie w latach 1791–1792 |
| title | The Commonwealth of Poland towards Russia in the final stage of the Great Diet (1791–1792) |
| title_full | The Commonwealth of Poland towards Russia in the final stage of the Great Diet (1791–1792) |
| title_fullStr | The Commonwealth of Poland towards Russia in the final stage of the Great Diet (1791–1792) |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Commonwealth of Poland towards Russia in the final stage of the Great Diet (1791–1792) |
| title_short | The Commonwealth of Poland towards Russia in the final stage of the Great Diet (1791–1792) |
| title_sort | commonwealth of poland towards russia in the final stage of the great diet 1791 1792 |
| topic | Sejm Wielki Konstytucja 3 maja Straż Praw polityka zagraniczna Rzeczypospolitej stosunki polsko-rosyjskie w latach 1791–1792 |
| url | https://czasopisma.uni.lodz.pl/pnh/article/view/3072 |
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