Selection biases and spillovers from collective conservation incentives in the Peruvian Amazon

Payments for ecosystem services are becoming popular components in strategies to conserve ecosystems and biodiversity, but their effectiveness remains poorly documented. Here we present counterfactual-based evidence on the conservation outcomes of the pilot stage of Peru’s National Forest Conservati...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Renzo Giudice, Jan Börner, Sven Wunder, Elias Cisneros
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: IOP Publishing 2019-01-01
Series:Environmental Research Letters
Subjects:
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aafc83
_version_ 1827870663574028288
author Renzo Giudice
Jan Börner
Sven Wunder
Elias Cisneros
author_facet Renzo Giudice
Jan Börner
Sven Wunder
Elias Cisneros
author_sort Renzo Giudice
collection DOAJ
description Payments for ecosystem services are becoming popular components in strategies to conserve ecosystems and biodiversity, but their effectiveness remains poorly documented. Here we present counterfactual-based evidence on the conservation outcomes of the pilot stage of Peru’s National Forest Conservation Program (NFCP). The NFCP provides direct payments to indigenous communities in the Amazon, conditional on avoided deforestation and the adoption of sustainable production systems. Using a spatially explicit quasi-experimental evaluation design, we show that the payment scheme has achieved only small conservation impacts, in terms of avoided deforestation. Counter-intuitively, these materialized largely on land not enrolled for conservation, due to spillover effects. Conservation effects on contracted land were negligible because communities were not chosen according to high deforestation threats, and they self-enrolled low-pressure forest areas for conservation. Occasional non-sanctioned contract incompliance contributed to these outcomes. We highlight implications for the design and implementation of up-scaled national conservation programs. Methodologically, we demonstrate the important role of choosing the appropriate spatial scale in evaluating area-based conservation measures.
first_indexed 2024-03-12T16:00:27Z
format Article
id doaj.art-4354cf80f04947048994501e2ae3341b
institution Directory Open Access Journal
issn 1748-9326
language English
last_indexed 2024-03-12T16:00:27Z
publishDate 2019-01-01
publisher IOP Publishing
record_format Article
series Environmental Research Letters
spelling doaj.art-4354cf80f04947048994501e2ae3341b2023-08-09T14:39:37ZengIOP PublishingEnvironmental Research Letters1748-93262019-01-0114404500410.1088/1748-9326/aafc83Selection biases and spillovers from collective conservation incentives in the Peruvian AmazonRenzo Giudice0https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3802-633XJan Börner1https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3034-5360Sven Wunder2https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9422-0260Elias Cisneros3https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9784-9240Center for Development Research, University of Bonn , Bonn, GermanyCenter for Development Research, University of Bonn , Bonn, Germany; Institute for Food and Resource Economics, University of Bonn , Bonn, GermanyEuropean Forest Institute (EFI) , Barcelona, Spain; Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), Lima, PeruDepartment of Economics, University of Göttingen , Göttingen, GermanyPayments for ecosystem services are becoming popular components in strategies to conserve ecosystems and biodiversity, but their effectiveness remains poorly documented. Here we present counterfactual-based evidence on the conservation outcomes of the pilot stage of Peru’s National Forest Conservation Program (NFCP). The NFCP provides direct payments to indigenous communities in the Amazon, conditional on avoided deforestation and the adoption of sustainable production systems. Using a spatially explicit quasi-experimental evaluation design, we show that the payment scheme has achieved only small conservation impacts, in terms of avoided deforestation. Counter-intuitively, these materialized largely on land not enrolled for conservation, due to spillover effects. Conservation effects on contracted land were negligible because communities were not chosen according to high deforestation threats, and they self-enrolled low-pressure forest areas for conservation. Occasional non-sanctioned contract incompliance contributed to these outcomes. We highlight implications for the design and implementation of up-scaled national conservation programs. Methodologically, we demonstrate the important role of choosing the appropriate spatial scale in evaluating area-based conservation measures.https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aafc83impact evaluationindigenous communitiesICDPleakagePESdeforestation
spellingShingle Renzo Giudice
Jan Börner
Sven Wunder
Elias Cisneros
Selection biases and spillovers from collective conservation incentives in the Peruvian Amazon
Environmental Research Letters
impact evaluation
indigenous communities
ICDP
leakage
PES
deforestation
title Selection biases and spillovers from collective conservation incentives in the Peruvian Amazon
title_full Selection biases and spillovers from collective conservation incentives in the Peruvian Amazon
title_fullStr Selection biases and spillovers from collective conservation incentives in the Peruvian Amazon
title_full_unstemmed Selection biases and spillovers from collective conservation incentives in the Peruvian Amazon
title_short Selection biases and spillovers from collective conservation incentives in the Peruvian Amazon
title_sort selection biases and spillovers from collective conservation incentives in the peruvian amazon
topic impact evaluation
indigenous communities
ICDP
leakage
PES
deforestation
url https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aafc83
work_keys_str_mv AT renzogiudice selectionbiasesandspilloversfromcollectiveconservationincentivesintheperuvianamazon
AT janborner selectionbiasesandspilloversfromcollectiveconservationincentivesintheperuvianamazon
AT svenwunder selectionbiasesandspilloversfromcollectiveconservationincentivesintheperuvianamazon
AT eliascisneros selectionbiasesandspilloversfromcollectiveconservationincentivesintheperuvianamazon