Stackelberg game pricing strategy between virtual power plant operators and electric vehicle users
Virtual power plant (VPP) is an important means of managing distributed energy. Reasonably formulating pricing strategies for VPP operators and electric vehicle (EV) users can guide EVs to fully consume renewable energy such as wind and solar, thus achieving a win-win situation for VPP operators and...
| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | zho |
| Published: |
Editorial Department of Electric Power Engineering Technology
2022-07-01
|
| Series: | 电力工程技术 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.epet-info.com/dlgcjs/article/html/220322369 |
| _version_ | 1811258771522977792 |
|---|---|
| author | LI Qiang ZHU Dandan HUANG Di WU Shengjun YANG Yongbiao SONG Jiaqi |
| author_facet | LI Qiang ZHU Dandan HUANG Di WU Shengjun YANG Yongbiao SONG Jiaqi |
| author_sort | LI Qiang |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Virtual power plant (VPP) is an important means of managing distributed energy. Reasonably formulating pricing strategies for VPP operators and electric vehicle (EV) users can guide EVs to fully consume renewable energy such as wind and solar, thus achieving a win-win situation for VPP operators and EV users. A stackelberg game model is firstly proposed in which a VPP with EVs is used as the electricity sales operator to participate in the orderly charging management of EVs. Operators formulate reasonable electricity selling prices through stackelberg game to guide the orderly charging of EVs, and coordinate various distributed resources to participate in the electricity market. Then, taking into account the volatility of wind power output and the uncertainty of conventional loads, the conditional value at risk (CVaR) theory is introduced into the modeling, and the model is transformed into a mixed integer linear programming problem solved by Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions and dual theory. Finally, based on an example, the optimal pricing strategy and output plan of VPP operators are given. The influence of different EV proportions, maximum energy storage capacity, and risk preference coefficient on the optimal solution is analyzed, which provides optimization ideas for VPP operators to improve revenue. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-12T18:19:35Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-4543815ed4794a31b8e8a5fde129dbc4 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2096-3203 |
| language | zho |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-12T18:19:35Z |
| publishDate | 2022-07-01 |
| publisher | Editorial Department of Electric Power Engineering Technology |
| record_format | Article |
| series | 电力工程技术 |
| spelling | doaj.art-4543815ed4794a31b8e8a5fde129dbc42022-12-22T03:21:30ZzhoEditorial Department of Electric Power Engineering Technology电力工程技术2096-32032022-07-0141418319110.12158/j.2096-3203.2022.04.024Stackelberg game pricing strategy between virtual power plant operators and electric vehicle usersLI Qiang0ZHU Dandan1HUANG Di2WU Shengjun3YANG Yongbiao4SONG Jiaqi5State Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Co., Ltd. Research Institute, Nanjing 211103, ChinaState Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Co., Ltd. Research Institute, Nanjing 211103, ChinaState Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Co., Ltd. Business Startups and Innovation Center, Nanjing 210024, ChinaState Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Co., Ltd. Research Institute, Nanjing 211103, ChinaSchool of Electrical Engineering, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, ChinaSchool of Electrical Engineering, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, ChinaVirtual power plant (VPP) is an important means of managing distributed energy. Reasonably formulating pricing strategies for VPP operators and electric vehicle (EV) users can guide EVs to fully consume renewable energy such as wind and solar, thus achieving a win-win situation for VPP operators and EV users. A stackelberg game model is firstly proposed in which a VPP with EVs is used as the electricity sales operator to participate in the orderly charging management of EVs. Operators formulate reasonable electricity selling prices through stackelberg game to guide the orderly charging of EVs, and coordinate various distributed resources to participate in the electricity market. Then, taking into account the volatility of wind power output and the uncertainty of conventional loads, the conditional value at risk (CVaR) theory is introduced into the modeling, and the model is transformed into a mixed integer linear programming problem solved by Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions and dual theory. Finally, based on an example, the optimal pricing strategy and output plan of VPP operators are given. The influence of different EV proportions, maximum energy storage capacity, and risk preference coefficient on the optimal solution is analyzed, which provides optimization ideas for VPP operators to improve revenue.https://www.epet-info.com/dlgcjs/article/html/220322369virtual power plant (vpp)electric vehicle (ev)stackelberg gamepricing strategykarush-kuhn-tucker (kkt) conditionsconditional value at risk (cvar) |
| spellingShingle | LI Qiang ZHU Dandan HUANG Di WU Shengjun YANG Yongbiao SONG Jiaqi Stackelberg game pricing strategy between virtual power plant operators and electric vehicle users 电力工程技术 virtual power plant (vpp) electric vehicle (ev) stackelberg game pricing strategy karush-kuhn-tucker (kkt) conditions conditional value at risk (cvar) |
| title | Stackelberg game pricing strategy between virtual power plant operators and electric vehicle users |
| title_full | Stackelberg game pricing strategy between virtual power plant operators and electric vehicle users |
| title_fullStr | Stackelberg game pricing strategy between virtual power plant operators and electric vehicle users |
| title_full_unstemmed | Stackelberg game pricing strategy between virtual power plant operators and electric vehicle users |
| title_short | Stackelberg game pricing strategy between virtual power plant operators and electric vehicle users |
| title_sort | stackelberg game pricing strategy between virtual power plant operators and electric vehicle users |
| topic | virtual power plant (vpp) electric vehicle (ev) stackelberg game pricing strategy karush-kuhn-tucker (kkt) conditions conditional value at risk (cvar) |
| url | https://www.epet-info.com/dlgcjs/article/html/220322369 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT liqiang stackelberggamepricingstrategybetweenvirtualpowerplantoperatorsandelectricvehicleusers AT zhudandan stackelberggamepricingstrategybetweenvirtualpowerplantoperatorsandelectricvehicleusers AT huangdi stackelberggamepricingstrategybetweenvirtualpowerplantoperatorsandelectricvehicleusers AT wushengjun stackelberggamepricingstrategybetweenvirtualpowerplantoperatorsandelectricvehicleusers AT yangyongbiao stackelberggamepricingstrategybetweenvirtualpowerplantoperatorsandelectricvehicleusers AT songjiaqi stackelberggamepricingstrategybetweenvirtualpowerplantoperatorsandelectricvehicleusers |