Practical Self-Deception
Philosophical accounts of self-deception almost invariably treat it as a phenomenon concerning belief. But this article argues that, in the very same sense that we can be self-deceived about belief, we can be self-deceived about matters that concern our practical identities — e.g., our desires, emot...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Associazione Culturale Humana.Mente
2018-06-01
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| Series: | Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies |
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| Online Access: | http://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/HM/article/view/195 |
| Summary: | Philosophical accounts of self-deception almost invariably treat it as a phenomenon concerning belief. But this article argues that, in the very same sense that we can be self-deceived about belief, we can be self-deceived about matters that concern our practical identities — e.g., our desires, emotions, values, and lifestyles. Given that our practical identities are at least as important to us as are our beliefs, philosophical accounts of self-deception should accommodate such practical self-deception. |
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| ISSN: | 1972-1293 |