Practical Self-Deception

Philosophical accounts of self-deception almost invariably treat it as a phenomenon concerning belief. But this article argues that, in the very same sense that we can be self-deceived about belief, we can be self-deceived about matters that concern our practical identities — e.g., our desires, emot...

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Main Author: Eric Funkhouser
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Associazione Culturale Humana.Mente 2018-06-01
Series:Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/HM/article/view/195
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author Eric Funkhouser
author_facet Eric Funkhouser
author_sort Eric Funkhouser
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description Philosophical accounts of self-deception almost invariably treat it as a phenomenon concerning belief. But this article argues that, in the very same sense that we can be self-deceived about belief, we can be self-deceived about matters that concern our practical identities — e.g., our desires, emotions, values, and lifestyles. Given that our practical identities are at least as important to us as are our beliefs, philosophical accounts of self-deception should accommodate such practical self-deception.
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spelling doaj.art-466c1b5316ff41049bebfd25bbc9a0652022-12-21T21:18:48ZengAssociazione Culturale Humana.MenteHumana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies1972-12932018-06-01520Practical Self-DeceptionEric Funkhouser0University of Arkansas, USAPhilosophical accounts of self-deception almost invariably treat it as a phenomenon concerning belief. But this article argues that, in the very same sense that we can be self-deceived about belief, we can be self-deceived about matters that concern our practical identities — e.g., our desires, emotions, values, and lifestyles. Given that our practical identities are at least as important to us as are our beliefs, philosophical accounts of self-deception should accommodate such practical self-deception.http://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/HM/article/view/195self deceptionbeliefspractical identities
spellingShingle Eric Funkhouser
Practical Self-Deception
Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies
self deception
beliefs
practical identities
title Practical Self-Deception
title_full Practical Self-Deception
title_fullStr Practical Self-Deception
title_full_unstemmed Practical Self-Deception
title_short Practical Self-Deception
title_sort practical self deception
topic self deception
beliefs
practical identities
url http://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/HM/article/view/195
work_keys_str_mv AT ericfunkhouser practicalselfdeception