Alianzas y política: un juego entre agentes civiles y armados

Illegal armed agents try to replace the state both in the monopoly of violenceand in the protection of civilian population. We pretend to show that this objective isachieved if armed agents build alliances with groups from the civilian population. Howto build this type of alliances? We propose a for...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: María del Pilar Castillo, Boris Salazar
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Universidad de Antioquia 2007-12-01
Series:Lecturas de Economía
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&pid=S0120-25962007000200003&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=es
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author María del Pilar Castillo
Boris Salazar
author_facet María del Pilar Castillo
Boris Salazar
author_sort María del Pilar Castillo
collection DOAJ
description Illegal armed agents try to replace the state both in the monopoly of violenceand in the protection of civilian population. We pretend to show that this objective isachieved if armed agents build alliances with groups from the civilian population. Howto build this type of alliances? We propose a formal exercise, represented by a game, wherean armed agent and a civilian one update their decisions concerning the relevance ofalready established alliances. Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of alliancesare derived from the results of our model.
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spelling doaj.art-46bd93aa6af9478390366e864402b27d2022-12-21T23:36:59ZengUniversidad de AntioquiaLecturas de Economía0120-25962007-12-0167677198Alianzas y política: un juego entre agentes civiles y armadosMaría del Pilar CastilloBoris SalazarIllegal armed agents try to replace the state both in the monopoly of violenceand in the protection of civilian population. We pretend to show that this objective isachieved if armed agents build alliances with groups from the civilian population. Howto build this type of alliances? We propose a formal exercise, represented by a game, wherean armed agent and a civilian one update their decisions concerning the relevance ofalready established alliances. Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of alliancesare derived from the results of our model.http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&pid=S0120-25962007000200003&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=esgame theoryalliances.
spellingShingle María del Pilar Castillo
Boris Salazar
Alianzas y política: un juego entre agentes civiles y armados
Lecturas de Economía
game theory
alliances.
title Alianzas y política: un juego entre agentes civiles y armados
title_full Alianzas y política: un juego entre agentes civiles y armados
title_fullStr Alianzas y política: un juego entre agentes civiles y armados
title_full_unstemmed Alianzas y política: un juego entre agentes civiles y armados
title_short Alianzas y política: un juego entre agentes civiles y armados
title_sort alianzas y politica un juego entre agentes civiles y armados
topic game theory
alliances.
url http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&pid=S0120-25962007000200003&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=es
work_keys_str_mv AT mariadelpilarcastillo alianzasypoliticaunjuegoentreagentescivilesyarmados
AT borissalazar alianzasypoliticaunjuegoentreagentescivilesyarmados