Extended Cognitive System and Epistemic Subject
The concept of an extended cognitive system is central to contemporary studies of cognition. In the paper I analyze the place of the epistemic subject within the extended cognitive system. Is it extended as well? In answering this question I focus on the differences between the first and the second...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Sciendo
2015-03-01
|
| Series: | Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1515/slgr-2015-0006 |
| _version_ | 1819007645021896704 |
|---|---|
| author | Trybulec Barbara |
| author_facet | Trybulec Barbara |
| author_sort | Trybulec Barbara |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The concept of an extended cognitive system is central to contemporary studies of cognition. In the paper I analyze the place of the epistemic subject within the extended cognitive system. Is it extended as well? In answering this question I focus on the differences between the first and the second wave of arguments for the extended mind thesis. I argue that the position of Cognitive Integration represented by Richard Menary is much more intuitive and fruitful in analyses of cognition and knowledge than the early argument formulated by Andy Clark and David Chalmers. Cognitive Integration is compatible with virtue epistemology of John Greco’s agent reliabilism. The epistemic subject is constituted by its cognitive character composed of an integrated set of cognitive abilities and processes. Some of these processes are extended, they are a manipulation of external informational structures and, as such, they constitute epistemic practices. Epistemic practices are normative; to conduct them correctly the epistemic subject needs to obey epistemic norms embedded in the cultural context. The epistemic subject is not extended because of the casual coupling with external informational artifacts which extend his mind from inside the head and into the world. Rather, cognitive practices constitute the subject’s mind, they transform his cognitive abilities, and this is what makes the mind and epistemic subject “extended”. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-21T00:27:52Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-46df279941bb4995a5d7f8fe054d8639 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 0860-150X 2199-6059 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-21T00:27:52Z |
| publishDate | 2015-03-01 |
| publisher | Sciendo |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric |
| spelling | doaj.art-46df279941bb4995a5d7f8fe054d86392022-12-21T19:21:56ZengSciendoStudies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric0860-150X2199-60592015-03-0140111112810.1515/slgr-2015-0006slgr-2015-0006Extended Cognitive System and Epistemic SubjectTrybulec Barbara0Maria Curie-Sklodowska University in LublinThe concept of an extended cognitive system is central to contemporary studies of cognition. In the paper I analyze the place of the epistemic subject within the extended cognitive system. Is it extended as well? In answering this question I focus on the differences between the first and the second wave of arguments for the extended mind thesis. I argue that the position of Cognitive Integration represented by Richard Menary is much more intuitive and fruitful in analyses of cognition and knowledge than the early argument formulated by Andy Clark and David Chalmers. Cognitive Integration is compatible with virtue epistemology of John Greco’s agent reliabilism. The epistemic subject is constituted by its cognitive character composed of an integrated set of cognitive abilities and processes. Some of these processes are extended, they are a manipulation of external informational structures and, as such, they constitute epistemic practices. Epistemic practices are normative; to conduct them correctly the epistemic subject needs to obey epistemic norms embedded in the cultural context. The epistemic subject is not extended because of the casual coupling with external informational artifacts which extend his mind from inside the head and into the world. Rather, cognitive practices constitute the subject’s mind, they transform his cognitive abilities, and this is what makes the mind and epistemic subject “extended”.https://doi.org/10.1515/slgr-2015-0006extended mindcognitive systemepistemic justificationepistemic subjectknowledgebelief |
| spellingShingle | Trybulec Barbara Extended Cognitive System and Epistemic Subject Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric extended mind cognitive system epistemic justification epistemic subject knowledge belief |
| title | Extended Cognitive System and Epistemic Subject |
| title_full | Extended Cognitive System and Epistemic Subject |
| title_fullStr | Extended Cognitive System and Epistemic Subject |
| title_full_unstemmed | Extended Cognitive System and Epistemic Subject |
| title_short | Extended Cognitive System and Epistemic Subject |
| title_sort | extended cognitive system and epistemic subject |
| topic | extended mind cognitive system epistemic justification epistemic subject knowledge belief |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1515/slgr-2015-0006 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT trybulecbarbara extendedcognitivesystemandepistemicsubject |