Scrutiny of the Two-Dimensional Argument against Physicalism
Chalmers’s two-dimensional argument against materialism (aka the zombie argument) is arguably the most ingenious attempt to ground a view about fundamental reality on epistemic considerations. From the conceivability of a being that is physically identical to a conscious being but that is deprived o...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
2023-10-01
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| Series: | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/88067 |
| _version_ | 1797661573731319808 |
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| author | Wilson Mendonça Julia Telles de Menezes |
| author_facet | Wilson Mendonça Julia Telles de Menezes |
| author_sort | Wilson Mendonça |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Chalmers’s two-dimensional argument against materialism (aka the zombie argument) is arguably the most ingenious attempt to ground a view about fundamental reality on epistemic considerations. From the conceivability of a being that is physically identical to a conscious being but that is deprived of phenomenal consciousness (a zombie), the argument draws on the interplay of the primary and the second intensions of the zombie hypothesis to infer the metaphysical possibility of a zombie world, and thus the falsity of physicalism about phenomenality. By means of a detailed reconstruction of the two-dimensional argument, the paper tries to isolate its most central assumption: that the role played by an epistemic scenario (an intentional object) in the verification of the zombie hypothesis is played by a nonintentionally individuated metaphysical world (the zombie world) considered as actual. The paper argues that no non-viciously circular case for this assumption has been made. Thus, the two-dimensional argument is at best inconclusive.
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| first_indexed | 2024-03-11T18:47:30Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-470a1e9a86b4409aa19a5a1fc4ba4519 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1414-4247 1808-1711 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-11T18:47:30Z |
| publishDate | 2023-10-01 |
| publisher | Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
| spelling | doaj.art-470a1e9a86b4409aa19a5a1fc4ba45192023-10-11T16:53:07ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology1414-42471808-17112023-10-0127210.5007/1808-1711.2023.e88067Scrutiny of the Two-Dimensional Argument against PhysicalismWilson Mendonça0Julia Telles de Menezes1Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, UFRJUniversidade Federal FluminenseChalmers’s two-dimensional argument against materialism (aka the zombie argument) is arguably the most ingenious attempt to ground a view about fundamental reality on epistemic considerations. From the conceivability of a being that is physically identical to a conscious being but that is deprived of phenomenal consciousness (a zombie), the argument draws on the interplay of the primary and the second intensions of the zombie hypothesis to infer the metaphysical possibility of a zombie world, and thus the falsity of physicalism about phenomenality. By means of a detailed reconstruction of the two-dimensional argument, the paper tries to isolate its most central assumption: that the role played by an epistemic scenario (an intentional object) in the verification of the zombie hypothesis is played by a nonintentionally individuated metaphysical world (the zombie world) considered as actual. The paper argues that no non-viciously circular case for this assumption has been made. Thus, the two-dimensional argument is at best inconclusive. https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/88067Epistemic possibilitiesIntensionsMetaphysical plenitudeMetaphysical possibilitiesStrong necessities |
| spellingShingle | Wilson Mendonça Julia Telles de Menezes Scrutiny of the Two-Dimensional Argument against Physicalism Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology Epistemic possibilities Intensions Metaphysical plenitude Metaphysical possibilities Strong necessities |
| title | Scrutiny of the Two-Dimensional Argument against Physicalism |
| title_full | Scrutiny of the Two-Dimensional Argument against Physicalism |
| title_fullStr | Scrutiny of the Two-Dimensional Argument against Physicalism |
| title_full_unstemmed | Scrutiny of the Two-Dimensional Argument against Physicalism |
| title_short | Scrutiny of the Two-Dimensional Argument against Physicalism |
| title_sort | scrutiny of the two dimensional argument against physicalism |
| topic | Epistemic possibilities Intensions Metaphysical plenitude Metaphysical possibilities Strong necessities |
| url | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/88067 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT wilsonmendonca scrutinyofthetwodimensionalargumentagainstphysicalism AT juliatellesdemenezes scrutinyofthetwodimensionalargumentagainstphysicalism |