Conditional Cooperation and the Marginal per Capita Return in Public Good Games
We investigate experimentally whether the extent of conditional cooperation in public good games depends on the marginal per capita return (MPCR) to the public good and type of game. The MPCR is varied from 0.2 to 0.4 to 0.8. The ‘standard’ game, in which three players contribute before a follower,...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2014-11-01
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| Series: | Games |
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| Online Access: | http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/5/4/234 |
| _version_ | 1828730255409414144 |
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| author | Edward J. Cartwright Denise Lovett |
| author_facet | Edward J. Cartwright Denise Lovett |
| author_sort | Edward J. Cartwright |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | We investigate experimentally whether the extent of conditional cooperation in public good games depends on the marginal per capita return (MPCR) to the public good and type of game. The MPCR is varied from 0.2 to 0.4 to 0.8. The ‘standard’ game, in which three players contribute before a follower, is compared with a leader-follower game, in which one player leads and three follow. Even though we observe less conditional cooperation for an MPCR of 0.2, the prevalence of conditional cooperation remains relatively stable to changes in the MPCR and game timing. In contrast, the level of MPCR has a strong effect on unconditional contributions. Our results highlight the critical role played by leaders in a public good game. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-12T17:27:21Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-47828b18305b4b5d8b544e9b87a4cee1 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2073-4336 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-12T17:27:21Z |
| publishDate | 2014-11-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Games |
| spelling | doaj.art-47828b18305b4b5d8b544e9b87a4cee12022-12-22T03:23:14ZengMDPI AGGames2073-43362014-11-015423425610.3390/g5040234g5040234Conditional Cooperation and the Marginal per Capita Return in Public Good GamesEdward J. Cartwright0Denise Lovett1School of Economics, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent CT2 7NP, UKSchool of Economics, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent CT2 7NP, UKWe investigate experimentally whether the extent of conditional cooperation in public good games depends on the marginal per capita return (MPCR) to the public good and type of game. The MPCR is varied from 0.2 to 0.4 to 0.8. The ‘standard’ game, in which three players contribute before a follower, is compared with a leader-follower game, in which one player leads and three follow. Even though we observe less conditional cooperation for an MPCR of 0.2, the prevalence of conditional cooperation remains relatively stable to changes in the MPCR and game timing. In contrast, the level of MPCR has a strong effect on unconditional contributions. Our results highlight the critical role played by leaders in a public good game.http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/5/4/234public goodconditional cooperationreciprocityleadership |
| spellingShingle | Edward J. Cartwright Denise Lovett Conditional Cooperation and the Marginal per Capita Return in Public Good Games Games public good conditional cooperation reciprocity leadership |
| title | Conditional Cooperation and the Marginal per Capita Return in Public Good Games |
| title_full | Conditional Cooperation and the Marginal per Capita Return in Public Good Games |
| title_fullStr | Conditional Cooperation and the Marginal per Capita Return in Public Good Games |
| title_full_unstemmed | Conditional Cooperation and the Marginal per Capita Return in Public Good Games |
| title_short | Conditional Cooperation and the Marginal per Capita Return in Public Good Games |
| title_sort | conditional cooperation and the marginal per capita return in public good games |
| topic | public good conditional cooperation reciprocity leadership |
| url | http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/5/4/234 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT edwardjcartwright conditionalcooperationandthemarginalpercapitareturninpublicgoodgames AT deniselovett conditionalcooperationandthemarginalpercapitareturninpublicgoodgames |