Metacognition, social cognition, and mentalizing in psychosis: are these distinct constructs when it comes to subjective experience or are we just splitting hairs?
Abstract Research using the integrated model of metacognition has suggested that the construct of metacognition could quantify the spectrum of activities that, if impaired, might cause many of the subjective disturbances found in psychosis. Research on social cognition and mentalizing in psychosis,...
| Main Authors: | , , , , , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
BMC
2021-07-01
|
| Series: | BMC Psychiatry |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1186/s12888-021-03338-4 |
| _version_ | 1819145187584114688 |
|---|---|
| author | P. H. Lysaker S. Cheli G. Dimaggio B. Buck K. A. Bonfils K. Huling C. Wiesepape J. T. Lysaker |
| author_facet | P. H. Lysaker S. Cheli G. Dimaggio B. Buck K. A. Bonfils K. Huling C. Wiesepape J. T. Lysaker |
| author_sort | P. H. Lysaker |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Abstract Research using the integrated model of metacognition has suggested that the construct of metacognition could quantify the spectrum of activities that, if impaired, might cause many of the subjective disturbances found in psychosis. Research on social cognition and mentalizing in psychosis, however, has also pointed to underlying deficits in how persons make sense of their experience of themselves and others. To explore the question of whether metacognitive research in psychosis offers unique insight in the midst of these other two emerging fields, we have offered a review of the constructs and research from each field. Following that summary, we discuss ways in which research on metacognition may be distinguished from research on social cognition and mentalizing in three broad categories: (1) experimental procedures, (2) theoretical advances, and (3) clinical applications or indicated interventions. In terms of its research methods, we will describe how metacognition makes a unique contribution to understanding disturbances in how persons make sense of and interpret their own experiences within the flow of life. We will next discuss how metacognitive research in psychosis uniquely describes an architecture which when compromised – as often occurs in psychosis – results in the loss of persons’ sense of purpose, possibilities, place in the world and cohesiveness of self. Turning to clinical issues, we explore how metacognitive research offers an operational model of the architecture which if repaired or restored should promote the recovery of a coherent sense of self and others in psychosis. Finally, we discuss the concrete implications of this for recovery-oriented treatment for psychosis as well as the need for further research on the commonalities of these approaches. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-22T12:54:03Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-4818a004d2624680a1424b689c0467ef |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1471-244X |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-22T12:54:03Z |
| publishDate | 2021-07-01 |
| publisher | BMC |
| record_format | Article |
| series | BMC Psychiatry |
| spelling | doaj.art-4818a004d2624680a1424b689c0467ef2022-12-21T18:25:10ZengBMCBMC Psychiatry1471-244X2021-07-0121111410.1186/s12888-021-03338-4Metacognition, social cognition, and mentalizing in psychosis: are these distinct constructs when it comes to subjective experience or are we just splitting hairs?P. H. Lysaker0S. Cheli1G. Dimaggio2B. Buck3K. A. Bonfils4K. Huling5C. Wiesepape6J. T. Lysaker7Richard L Roudebush VA Medical Center, Department of PsychiatryUniversity of Florence, School of Human Health SciencesTerzocentro di Psicoterapia Cognitiva, Associazione di Psicologia CognitivaDepartment of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, University of Washington, Behavioral Research in Technology and Engineering (BRiTE) CenterUniversity of Southern Mississippi, School of PsychologyUniversity of Indianapolis, School of Psychological SciencesIndiana State University, Department of PsychologyDepartment of Philosophy, Emory UniversityAbstract Research using the integrated model of metacognition has suggested that the construct of metacognition could quantify the spectrum of activities that, if impaired, might cause many of the subjective disturbances found in psychosis. Research on social cognition and mentalizing in psychosis, however, has also pointed to underlying deficits in how persons make sense of their experience of themselves and others. To explore the question of whether metacognitive research in psychosis offers unique insight in the midst of these other two emerging fields, we have offered a review of the constructs and research from each field. Following that summary, we discuss ways in which research on metacognition may be distinguished from research on social cognition and mentalizing in three broad categories: (1) experimental procedures, (2) theoretical advances, and (3) clinical applications or indicated interventions. In terms of its research methods, we will describe how metacognition makes a unique contribution to understanding disturbances in how persons make sense of and interpret their own experiences within the flow of life. We will next discuss how metacognitive research in psychosis uniquely describes an architecture which when compromised – as often occurs in psychosis – results in the loss of persons’ sense of purpose, possibilities, place in the world and cohesiveness of self. Turning to clinical issues, we explore how metacognitive research offers an operational model of the architecture which if repaired or restored should promote the recovery of a coherent sense of self and others in psychosis. Finally, we discuss the concrete implications of this for recovery-oriented treatment for psychosis as well as the need for further research on the commonalities of these approaches.https://doi.org/10.1186/s12888-021-03338-4MetacognitionMentalizingSocial cognitionSelfPsychosisSchizophrenia |
| spellingShingle | P. H. Lysaker S. Cheli G. Dimaggio B. Buck K. A. Bonfils K. Huling C. Wiesepape J. T. Lysaker Metacognition, social cognition, and mentalizing in psychosis: are these distinct constructs when it comes to subjective experience or are we just splitting hairs? BMC Psychiatry Metacognition Mentalizing Social cognition Self Psychosis Schizophrenia |
| title | Metacognition, social cognition, and mentalizing in psychosis: are these distinct constructs when it comes to subjective experience or are we just splitting hairs? |
| title_full | Metacognition, social cognition, and mentalizing in psychosis: are these distinct constructs when it comes to subjective experience or are we just splitting hairs? |
| title_fullStr | Metacognition, social cognition, and mentalizing in psychosis: are these distinct constructs when it comes to subjective experience or are we just splitting hairs? |
| title_full_unstemmed | Metacognition, social cognition, and mentalizing in psychosis: are these distinct constructs when it comes to subjective experience or are we just splitting hairs? |
| title_short | Metacognition, social cognition, and mentalizing in psychosis: are these distinct constructs when it comes to subjective experience or are we just splitting hairs? |
| title_sort | metacognition social cognition and mentalizing in psychosis are these distinct constructs when it comes to subjective experience or are we just splitting hairs |
| topic | Metacognition Mentalizing Social cognition Self Psychosis Schizophrenia |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1186/s12888-021-03338-4 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT phlysaker metacognitionsocialcognitionandmentalizinginpsychosisarethesedistinctconstructswhenitcomestosubjectiveexperienceorarewejustsplittinghairs AT scheli metacognitionsocialcognitionandmentalizinginpsychosisarethesedistinctconstructswhenitcomestosubjectiveexperienceorarewejustsplittinghairs AT gdimaggio metacognitionsocialcognitionandmentalizinginpsychosisarethesedistinctconstructswhenitcomestosubjectiveexperienceorarewejustsplittinghairs AT bbuck metacognitionsocialcognitionandmentalizinginpsychosisarethesedistinctconstructswhenitcomestosubjectiveexperienceorarewejustsplittinghairs AT kabonfils metacognitionsocialcognitionandmentalizinginpsychosisarethesedistinctconstructswhenitcomestosubjectiveexperienceorarewejustsplittinghairs AT khuling metacognitionsocialcognitionandmentalizinginpsychosisarethesedistinctconstructswhenitcomestosubjectiveexperienceorarewejustsplittinghairs AT cwiesepape metacognitionsocialcognitionandmentalizinginpsychosisarethesedistinctconstructswhenitcomestosubjectiveexperienceorarewejustsplittinghairs AT jtlysaker metacognitionsocialcognitionandmentalizinginpsychosisarethesedistinctconstructswhenitcomestosubjectiveexperienceorarewejustsplittinghairs |