Ordinary wrongdoing and responsibility worth wanting

In this paper it is argued that we can have defensible attributions of responsibility without first answering the question whether determinism and free will are compatible. The key to such a defense is a focus on the fact that most actions for which we hold one another responsible are quite ordinary...

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Main Author: Maureen Sie
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University of Rijeka. Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences 2005-01-01
Series:European Journal of Analytic Philosophy
Subjects:
Online Access:https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/134717
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author Maureen Sie
author_facet Maureen Sie
author_sort Maureen Sie
collection DOAJ
description In this paper it is argued that we can have defensible attributions of responsibility without first answering the question whether determinism and free will are compatible. The key to such a defense is a focus on the fact that most actions for which we hold one another responsible are quite ordinary—trespassing traffic regulations, tardiness, or breaking a promise. As we will show, unlike actions that problematize our moral competence — e.g. akratic and ‘moral monster’- like ones—ordinary ‘wrong’ actions often disclose this competence. Hence, no counterfactual assumption is needed to establish that some of us are sometimes responsible for some of the actions we perform.
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spelling doaj.art-483648b890c44119b91fbb352f0ddd522022-12-22T01:10:38ZengUniversity of Rijeka. Faculty of Humanities and Social SciencesEuropean Journal of Analytic Philosophy1845-84751849-05142005-01-01126782Ordinary wrongdoing and responsibility worth wantingMaureen SieIn this paper it is argued that we can have defensible attributions of responsibility without first answering the question whether determinism and free will are compatible. The key to such a defense is a focus on the fact that most actions for which we hold one another responsible are quite ordinary—trespassing traffic regulations, tardiness, or breaking a promise. As we will show, unlike actions that problematize our moral competence — e.g. akratic and ‘moral monster’- like ones—ordinary ‘wrong’ actions often disclose this competence. Hence, no counterfactual assumption is needed to establish that some of us are sometimes responsible for some of the actions we perform.https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/134717determinismfree willmoral/normative competenceresponsibilitywrongdoing
spellingShingle Maureen Sie
Ordinary wrongdoing and responsibility worth wanting
European Journal of Analytic Philosophy
determinism
free will
moral/normative competence
responsibility
wrongdoing
title Ordinary wrongdoing and responsibility worth wanting
title_full Ordinary wrongdoing and responsibility worth wanting
title_fullStr Ordinary wrongdoing and responsibility worth wanting
title_full_unstemmed Ordinary wrongdoing and responsibility worth wanting
title_short Ordinary wrongdoing and responsibility worth wanting
title_sort ordinary wrongdoing and responsibility worth wanting
topic determinism
free will
moral/normative competence
responsibility
wrongdoing
url https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/134717
work_keys_str_mv AT maureensie ordinarywrongdoingandresponsibilityworthwanting