The Road to Defeat, The Reorganisation of the Italian Army After the Winter 1940-41
Following the Italian defeat in North Africa and the setback suffered in the war against Greece, the Regio Esercito (the Italian Army) had lost ten of its 70 divisions and suffered heavy losses. Facing developments following the seizure of the Balkans and Germany’s attack against the Soviet Union, M...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Gruppo editoriale Tab S.r.l.
2023-11-01
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| Series: | Nuova Antologia Militare |
| Online Access: | https://www.tabedizioni.it/web/content/260111 |
| _version_ | 1797358052815405056 |
|---|---|
| author | Pierpaolo Battistelli |
| author_facet | Pierpaolo Battistelli |
| author_sort | Pierpaolo Battistelli |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Following the Italian defeat in North Africa and the setback suffered in the war against Greece, the Regio Esercito (the Italian Army) had lost ten of its 70 divisions and suffered heavy losses. Facing developments following the seizure of the Balkans and Germany’s attack against the Soviet Union, Mussolini ordered a reorganisation of the army which had to be brought up to strength in order to meet his political-strategic goals. Mussolini’s aim was to reinforce the Italian presence on the Eastern Front, guarantee the Army readiness for the occupation of the French territories (southern France, Tunisia, Corsica), and maintain a strategic reserve while reinforcing the North African front and securing the occupied territories in the Balkans. General Ugo Cavallero, the Chief of General Staff, introduced some changes to this plan which was further altered by the Army Staff (Stato Maggiore Regio Esercito), mostly because of the lack of weapons and materiel. By the spring of 1942 the Italian Army not only was short Mussolini’s goal of 80 divisions, but had also allocated more resources to the Balkans than envisaged at first. Problems occurred following Mussolini’s decision to bring the Italian forces on the Eastern Front up to the strength of an entire army, which was made by depleting the other fronts (mostly the troops ready to seize the French territories) and the strategic reserve as well. The defeat suffered in North Africa in November 1942, along with the Allied landing in French North-West Africa, led to the employment of the last remaining operational divisions and to some kind of full commitment due to the seizure and garrisoning of southern France and Corsica. The final blow came with the losses suffered on the Eastern Front in the 1942- 43 Stalingrad offensive and with the creation of the Tunisian bridgehead, which reduced the Italian Army combat effectiveness. By the spring of 1943, Tunisia being lost in May, it was clear that the Army was no longer capable to defend the territories seized and the homeland, having lost most of its operational effectiveness and being no longer capable of creating new units. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-08T14:54:14Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-483e8601a77a451c95476ade20be6974 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2704-9795 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-08T14:54:14Z |
| publishDate | 2023-11-01 |
| publisher | Gruppo editoriale Tab S.r.l. |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Nuova Antologia Militare |
| spelling | doaj.art-483e8601a77a451c95476ade20be69742024-01-10T15:35:31ZengGruppo editoriale Tab S.r.l.Nuova Antologia Militare2704-97952023-11-0141650153610.36158/978889295793016The Road to Defeat, The Reorganisation of the Italian Army After the Winter 1940-41Pierpaolo Battistelli0University of AFollowing the Italian defeat in North Africa and the setback suffered in the war against Greece, the Regio Esercito (the Italian Army) had lost ten of its 70 divisions and suffered heavy losses. Facing developments following the seizure of the Balkans and Germany’s attack against the Soviet Union, Mussolini ordered a reorganisation of the army which had to be brought up to strength in order to meet his political-strategic goals. Mussolini’s aim was to reinforce the Italian presence on the Eastern Front, guarantee the Army readiness for the occupation of the French territories (southern France, Tunisia, Corsica), and maintain a strategic reserve while reinforcing the North African front and securing the occupied territories in the Balkans. General Ugo Cavallero, the Chief of General Staff, introduced some changes to this plan which was further altered by the Army Staff (Stato Maggiore Regio Esercito), mostly because of the lack of weapons and materiel. By the spring of 1942 the Italian Army not only was short Mussolini’s goal of 80 divisions, but had also allocated more resources to the Balkans than envisaged at first. Problems occurred following Mussolini’s decision to bring the Italian forces on the Eastern Front up to the strength of an entire army, which was made by depleting the other fronts (mostly the troops ready to seize the French territories) and the strategic reserve as well. The defeat suffered in North Africa in November 1942, along with the Allied landing in French North-West Africa, led to the employment of the last remaining operational divisions and to some kind of full commitment due to the seizure and garrisoning of southern France and Corsica. The final blow came with the losses suffered on the Eastern Front in the 1942- 43 Stalingrad offensive and with the creation of the Tunisian bridgehead, which reduced the Italian Army combat effectiveness. By the spring of 1943, Tunisia being lost in May, it was clear that the Army was no longer capable to defend the territories seized and the homeland, having lost most of its operational effectiveness and being no longer capable of creating new units.https://www.tabedizioni.it/web/content/260111 |
| spellingShingle | Pierpaolo Battistelli The Road to Defeat, The Reorganisation of the Italian Army After the Winter 1940-41 Nuova Antologia Militare |
| title | The Road to Defeat, The Reorganisation of the Italian Army After the Winter 1940-41 |
| title_full | The Road to Defeat, The Reorganisation of the Italian Army After the Winter 1940-41 |
| title_fullStr | The Road to Defeat, The Reorganisation of the Italian Army After the Winter 1940-41 |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Road to Defeat, The Reorganisation of the Italian Army After the Winter 1940-41 |
| title_short | The Road to Defeat, The Reorganisation of the Italian Army After the Winter 1940-41 |
| title_sort | road to defeat the reorganisation of the italian army after the winter 1940 41 |
| url | https://www.tabedizioni.it/web/content/260111 |
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