The Prior Can Often Only Be Understood in the Context of the Likelihood

A key sticking point of Bayesian analysis is the choice of prior distribution, and there is a vast literature on potential defaults including uniform priors, Jeffreys’ priors, reference priors, maximum entropy priors, and weakly informative priors. These methods, however, often manifest a key concep...

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Main Authors: Andrew Gelman, Daniel Simpson, Michael Betancourt
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2017-10-01
Series:Entropy
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/19/10/555
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author Andrew Gelman
Daniel Simpson
Michael Betancourt
author_facet Andrew Gelman
Daniel Simpson
Michael Betancourt
author_sort Andrew Gelman
collection DOAJ
description A key sticking point of Bayesian analysis is the choice of prior distribution, and there is a vast literature on potential defaults including uniform priors, Jeffreys’ priors, reference priors, maximum entropy priors, and weakly informative priors. These methods, however, often manifest a key conceptual tension in prior modeling: a model encoding true prior information should be chosen without reference to the model of the measurement process, but almost all common prior modeling techniques are implicitly motivated by a reference likelihood. In this paper we resolve this apparent paradox by placing the choice of prior into the context of the entire Bayesian analysis, from inference to prediction to model evaluation.
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spelling doaj.art-4882cf6466934e858d4cccf6b333c2972022-12-22T02:07:00ZengMDPI AGEntropy1099-43002017-10-01191055510.3390/e19100555e19100555The Prior Can Often Only Be Understood in the Context of the LikelihoodAndrew Gelman0Daniel Simpson1Michael Betancourt2Department of Statistics, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027, USADepartment of Statistical Sciences, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON M5S, CanadaInstitute for Social and Economic Research and Policy, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027, USAA key sticking point of Bayesian analysis is the choice of prior distribution, and there is a vast literature on potential defaults including uniform priors, Jeffreys’ priors, reference priors, maximum entropy priors, and weakly informative priors. These methods, however, often manifest a key conceptual tension in prior modeling: a model encoding true prior information should be chosen without reference to the model of the measurement process, but almost all common prior modeling techniques are implicitly motivated by a reference likelihood. In this paper we resolve this apparent paradox by placing the choice of prior into the context of the entire Bayesian analysis, from inference to prediction to model evaluation.https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/19/10/555Bayesian inferencedefault priorsprior distribution
spellingShingle Andrew Gelman
Daniel Simpson
Michael Betancourt
The Prior Can Often Only Be Understood in the Context of the Likelihood
Entropy
Bayesian inference
default priors
prior distribution
title The Prior Can Often Only Be Understood in the Context of the Likelihood
title_full The Prior Can Often Only Be Understood in the Context of the Likelihood
title_fullStr The Prior Can Often Only Be Understood in the Context of the Likelihood
title_full_unstemmed The Prior Can Often Only Be Understood in the Context of the Likelihood
title_short The Prior Can Often Only Be Understood in the Context of the Likelihood
title_sort prior can often only be understood in the context of the likelihood
topic Bayesian inference
default priors
prior distribution
url https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/19/10/555
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