After Finitude and the Question of Phenomenological Givenness

Quentin Meillassoux’s 2006 After Finitude offered a sharp critique of the phenomenological project, charging that phenomenology was one of the “two principal media” of correlationism—ultimately reducible to an “extreme idealism.” Meillassoux grounds this accusation in an account of givenness that pr...

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Main Author: J. Leavitt Pearl
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University of Windsor 2018-01-01
Series:PhaenEx: Journal of Existential and Phenomenological Theory and Culture
Online Access:https://phaenex.uwindsor.ca/index.php/phaenex/article/view/5028
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author J. Leavitt Pearl
author_facet J. Leavitt Pearl
author_sort J. Leavitt Pearl
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description Quentin Meillassoux’s 2006 After Finitude offered a sharp critique of the phenomenological project, charging that phenomenology was one of the “two principal media” of correlationism—ultimately reducible to an “extreme idealism.” Meillassoux grounds this accusation in an account of givenness that presupposes that “every variety of givenness” finds its genesis within the positing of the subject. However, this critique fails to hit its mark precisely because it presupposes an account of intuitive givenness that is entirely foreign to the phenomenological project. Quite against Meillassoux’s conflation of givenness, the world-for-us, and the positing subject—the very centre of the phenomenological project is the recognition that intuitive givenness cannot be reduced to the constructive activity of the subject. Givenness is marked by a heterogeneity; givenness refers to what is given to us, not to what emerges from us.
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spelling doaj.art-493e421f2b7f4090825a0e4bcd2a1a0e2022-12-22T03:08:47ZengUniversity of WindsorPhaenEx: Journal of Existential and Phenomenological Theory and Culture1911-15762018-01-0112210.22329/p.v12i2.5028After Finitude and the Question of Phenomenological GivennessJ. Leavitt PearlQuentin Meillassoux’s 2006 After Finitude offered a sharp critique of the phenomenological project, charging that phenomenology was one of the “two principal media” of correlationism—ultimately reducible to an “extreme idealism.” Meillassoux grounds this accusation in an account of givenness that presupposes that “every variety of givenness” finds its genesis within the positing of the subject. However, this critique fails to hit its mark precisely because it presupposes an account of intuitive givenness that is entirely foreign to the phenomenological project. Quite against Meillassoux’s conflation of givenness, the world-for-us, and the positing subject—the very centre of the phenomenological project is the recognition that intuitive givenness cannot be reduced to the constructive activity of the subject. Givenness is marked by a heterogeneity; givenness refers to what is given to us, not to what emerges from us.https://phaenex.uwindsor.ca/index.php/phaenex/article/view/5028
spellingShingle J. Leavitt Pearl
After Finitude and the Question of Phenomenological Givenness
PhaenEx: Journal of Existential and Phenomenological Theory and Culture
title After Finitude and the Question of Phenomenological Givenness
title_full After Finitude and the Question of Phenomenological Givenness
title_fullStr After Finitude and the Question of Phenomenological Givenness
title_full_unstemmed After Finitude and the Question of Phenomenological Givenness
title_short After Finitude and the Question of Phenomenological Givenness
title_sort after finitude and the question of phenomenological givenness
url https://phaenex.uwindsor.ca/index.php/phaenex/article/view/5028
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