Critical interpretation of practical and legal conclusions on the lack of free will and moral responsibility
The article analyzes the concepts of moral responsibility and free will in their close relationship and looks into their essential characteristics and influence on the legal system. Logical inconsistency of the conclusions on moral inadmissibility of the functioning of criminal law and legal proceed...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Ukrainian Center for Cultural Studies
2018-12-01
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| Series: | Cхід |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://skhid.kubg.edu.ua/article/view/148409 |
| _version_ | 1818429441463812096 |
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| author | Halyna Diakovska Vasyl Hontar |
| author_facet | Halyna Diakovska Vasyl Hontar |
| author_sort | Halyna Diakovska |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The article analyzes the concepts of moral responsibility and free will in their close relationship and looks into their essential characteristics and influence on the legal system. Logical inconsistency of the conclusions on moral inadmissibility of the functioning of criminal law and legal proceedings in case of no free will and hence moral responsibility is proved. Some alternative non-moral approaches to substantiation of legal institutions in a world without moral responsibility are outlined. The former consider that philosophy makes it possible to address the question of why man should be responsible for his actions. Legal systems are mainly supported by the thesis that free will is the social basis for imposing responsibility on man for his behavior. Freedom is the main personal social implication for criminal responsibility. An attempt is made to substantiate the illegitimacy of the conclusions regarding the internal contradiction in the functioning of legal systems in a world without moral responsibility. It is shown that not all legal systems are based on moral principles, especially in a world where moral responsibility is not expected in principle. Therefore, in the world lacking moral responsibility no guilt and accusations of injustice are unlawful. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-14T15:17:34Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-498af04dcacc4b15a876124a5f331713 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1728-9343 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-14T15:17:34Z |
| publishDate | 2018-12-01 |
| publisher | Ukrainian Center for Cultural Studies |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Cхід |
| spelling | doaj.art-498af04dcacc4b15a876124a5f3317132022-12-21T22:56:16ZengUkrainian Center for Cultural StudiesCхід1728-93432018-12-0105(157)303310.21847/1728-9343.2018.5(157).148409148409Critical interpretation of practical and legal conclusions on the lack of free will and moral responsibilityHalyna Diakovska0Vasyl Hontar1Donbas State Pedagogical University, SlovyanskDonbas State Pedagogical University, SlovyanskThe article analyzes the concepts of moral responsibility and free will in their close relationship and looks into their essential characteristics and influence on the legal system. Logical inconsistency of the conclusions on moral inadmissibility of the functioning of criminal law and legal proceedings in case of no free will and hence moral responsibility is proved. Some alternative non-moral approaches to substantiation of legal institutions in a world without moral responsibility are outlined. The former consider that philosophy makes it possible to address the question of why man should be responsible for his actions. Legal systems are mainly supported by the thesis that free will is the social basis for imposing responsibility on man for his behavior. Freedom is the main personal social implication for criminal responsibility. An attempt is made to substantiate the illegitimacy of the conclusions regarding the internal contradiction in the functioning of legal systems in a world without moral responsibility. It is shown that not all legal systems are based on moral principles, especially in a world where moral responsibility is not expected in principle. Therefore, in the world lacking moral responsibility no guilt and accusations of injustice are unlawful.http://skhid.kubg.edu.ua/article/view/148409analytical philosophyfree willmoral responsibilitylegal systemretributive functionjustice |
| spellingShingle | Halyna Diakovska Vasyl Hontar Critical interpretation of practical and legal conclusions on the lack of free will and moral responsibility Cхід analytical philosophy free will moral responsibility legal system retributive function justice |
| title | Critical interpretation of practical and legal conclusions on the lack of free will and moral responsibility |
| title_full | Critical interpretation of practical and legal conclusions on the lack of free will and moral responsibility |
| title_fullStr | Critical interpretation of practical and legal conclusions on the lack of free will and moral responsibility |
| title_full_unstemmed | Critical interpretation of practical and legal conclusions on the lack of free will and moral responsibility |
| title_short | Critical interpretation of practical and legal conclusions on the lack of free will and moral responsibility |
| title_sort | critical interpretation of practical and legal conclusions on the lack of free will and moral responsibility |
| topic | analytical philosophy free will moral responsibility legal system retributive function justice |
| url | http://skhid.kubg.edu.ua/article/view/148409 |
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