The effects of social vs. asocial threats on group cooperation and manipulation of perceived threats
Individuals benefit from maintaining the well-being of their social groups and helping their groups to survive threats such as intergroup competition, harsh environments and epidemics. Correspondingly, much research shows that groups cooperate more when competing against other groups. However, ‘soci...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Cambridge University Press
2020-01-01
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| Series: | Evolutionary Human Sciences |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S2513843X20000481/type/journal_article |
| _version_ | 1827995036552265728 |
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| author | Pat Barclay Stephen Benard |
| author_facet | Pat Barclay Stephen Benard |
| author_sort | Pat Barclay |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Individuals benefit from maintaining the well-being of their social groups and helping their groups to survive threats such as intergroup competition, harsh environments and epidemics. Correspondingly, much research shows that groups cooperate more when competing against other groups. However, ‘social’ threats (i.e. outgroups) should elicit stronger cooperation than ‘asocial’ threats (e.g. environments, diseases) because (a) social losses involve a competitor's gain and (b) a strong cooperative reaction to defend the group may deter future outgroup threats. We tested this prediction in a multiround public goods game where groups faced periodic risks of failure (i.e. loss of earnings) which could be overcome by sufficient cooperation. This threat of failure was framed as either a social threat (intergroup competition) or an asocial threat (harsh environment). We find that cooperation was higher in response to social threats than asocial threats. We also examined participants’ willingness to manipulate apparent threats to the group: participants raised the perceived threat level similarly for social and asocial threats, but high-ranking participants increased the appearance of social threats more than low-ranking participants did. These results show that people treat social threats differently than asocial threats, and support previous work on leaders’ willingness to manipulate perceived threats. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-10T04:50:20Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-49a5f9f4e6474d0a94d0348de9b59af5 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2513-843X |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-10T04:50:20Z |
| publishDate | 2020-01-01 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Evolutionary Human Sciences |
| spelling | doaj.art-49a5f9f4e6474d0a94d0348de9b59af52023-03-09T12:32:19ZengCambridge University PressEvolutionary Human Sciences2513-843X2020-01-01210.1017/ehs.2020.48The effects of social vs. asocial threats on group cooperation and manipulation of perceived threatsPat Barclay0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7905-9069Stephen Benard1Department of Psychology, University of Guelph, 50 Stone Rd. E., Guelph, N1G 2W1, ON, CanadaDepartment of Sociology, Indiana University, Ballantine Hall, 1020 E. Kirkland Ave, Bloomington, 47405, IN, USAIndividuals benefit from maintaining the well-being of their social groups and helping their groups to survive threats such as intergroup competition, harsh environments and epidemics. Correspondingly, much research shows that groups cooperate more when competing against other groups. However, ‘social’ threats (i.e. outgroups) should elicit stronger cooperation than ‘asocial’ threats (e.g. environments, diseases) because (a) social losses involve a competitor's gain and (b) a strong cooperative reaction to defend the group may deter future outgroup threats. We tested this prediction in a multiround public goods game where groups faced periodic risks of failure (i.e. loss of earnings) which could be overcome by sufficient cooperation. This threat of failure was framed as either a social threat (intergroup competition) or an asocial threat (harsh environment). We find that cooperation was higher in response to social threats than asocial threats. We also examined participants’ willingness to manipulate apparent threats to the group: participants raised the perceived threat level similarly for social and asocial threats, but high-ranking participants increased the appearance of social threats more than low-ranking participants did. These results show that people treat social threats differently than asocial threats, and support previous work on leaders’ willingness to manipulate perceived threats.https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S2513843X20000481/type/journal_articleSocial dilemmapublic goodthreat-dependent cooperationleadershipintergroup competitionVolunteer's Dilemma |
| spellingShingle | Pat Barclay Stephen Benard The effects of social vs. asocial threats on group cooperation and manipulation of perceived threats Evolutionary Human Sciences Social dilemma public good threat-dependent cooperation leadership intergroup competition Volunteer's Dilemma |
| title | The effects of social vs. asocial threats on group cooperation and manipulation of perceived threats |
| title_full | The effects of social vs. asocial threats on group cooperation and manipulation of perceived threats |
| title_fullStr | The effects of social vs. asocial threats on group cooperation and manipulation of perceived threats |
| title_full_unstemmed | The effects of social vs. asocial threats on group cooperation and manipulation of perceived threats |
| title_short | The effects of social vs. asocial threats on group cooperation and manipulation of perceived threats |
| title_sort | effects of social vs asocial threats on group cooperation and manipulation of perceived threats |
| topic | Social dilemma public good threat-dependent cooperation leadership intergroup competition Volunteer's Dilemma |
| url | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S2513843X20000481/type/journal_article |
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