Development of the framework for quantitative cyber risk assessment in nuclear facilities
Industrial control systems in nuclear facilities are facing increasing cyber threats due to the widespread use of information and communication equipment. To implement cyber security programs effectively through the RG 5.71, it is necessary to quantitatively assess cyber risks. However, this can be...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Elsevier
2023-06-01
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| Series: | Nuclear Engineering and Technology |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1738573323001328 |
| _version_ | 1797811051893358592 |
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| author | Kwang-Seop Son Jae-Gu Song Jung-Woon Lee |
| author_facet | Kwang-Seop Son Jae-Gu Song Jung-Woon Lee |
| author_sort | Kwang-Seop Son |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Industrial control systems in nuclear facilities are facing increasing cyber threats due to the widespread use of information and communication equipment. To implement cyber security programs effectively through the RG 5.71, it is necessary to quantitatively assess cyber risks. However, this can be challenging due to limited historical data on threats and customized Critical Digital Assets (CDAs) in nuclear facilities. Previous works have focused on identifying data flows, the assets where the data is stored and processed, which means that the methods are heavily biased towards information security concerns. Additionally, in nuclear facilities, cyber threats need to be analyzed from a safety perspective. In this study, we use the system theoretic process analysis to identify system-level threat scenarios that could violate safety constraints. Instead of quantifying the likelihood of exploiting vulnerabilities, we quantify Security Control Measures (SCMs) against the identified threat scenarios. We classify the system and CDAs into four consequence-based classes, as presented in NEI 13–10, to analyze the adversary impact on CDAs. This allows for the ranking of identified threat scenarios according to the quantified SCMs. The proposed framework enables stakeholders to more effectively and accurately rank cyber risks, as well as establish security and response strategies. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-13T07:17:55Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-49f57b883bcf48a6b2e5a456dd84c652 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1738-5733 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-13T07:17:55Z |
| publishDate | 2023-06-01 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Nuclear Engineering and Technology |
| spelling | doaj.art-49f57b883bcf48a6b2e5a456dd84c6522023-06-05T04:12:44ZengElsevierNuclear Engineering and Technology1738-57332023-06-0155620342046Development of the framework for quantitative cyber risk assessment in nuclear facilitiesKwang-Seop Son0Jae-Gu Song1Jung-Woon Lee2Corresponding author.; Security R&D Team, Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, South KoreaSecurity R&D Team, Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, South KoreaSecurity R&D Team, Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, South KoreaIndustrial control systems in nuclear facilities are facing increasing cyber threats due to the widespread use of information and communication equipment. To implement cyber security programs effectively through the RG 5.71, it is necessary to quantitatively assess cyber risks. However, this can be challenging due to limited historical data on threats and customized Critical Digital Assets (CDAs) in nuclear facilities. Previous works have focused on identifying data flows, the assets where the data is stored and processed, which means that the methods are heavily biased towards information security concerns. Additionally, in nuclear facilities, cyber threats need to be analyzed from a safety perspective. In this study, we use the system theoretic process analysis to identify system-level threat scenarios that could violate safety constraints. Instead of quantifying the likelihood of exploiting vulnerabilities, we quantify Security Control Measures (SCMs) against the identified threat scenarios. We classify the system and CDAs into four consequence-based classes, as presented in NEI 13–10, to analyze the adversary impact on CDAs. This allows for the ranking of identified threat scenarios according to the quantified SCMs. The proposed framework enables stakeholders to more effectively and accurately rank cyber risks, as well as establish security and response strategies.http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1738573323001328TPAThreat scenarioAttack vectorTAMSecurity control methodQuantification of cyber risk |
| spellingShingle | Kwang-Seop Son Jae-Gu Song Jung-Woon Lee Development of the framework for quantitative cyber risk assessment in nuclear facilities Nuclear Engineering and Technology TPA Threat scenario Attack vector TAM Security control method Quantification of cyber risk |
| title | Development of the framework for quantitative cyber risk assessment in nuclear facilities |
| title_full | Development of the framework for quantitative cyber risk assessment in nuclear facilities |
| title_fullStr | Development of the framework for quantitative cyber risk assessment in nuclear facilities |
| title_full_unstemmed | Development of the framework for quantitative cyber risk assessment in nuclear facilities |
| title_short | Development of the framework for quantitative cyber risk assessment in nuclear facilities |
| title_sort | development of the framework for quantitative cyber risk assessment in nuclear facilities |
| topic | TPA Threat scenario Attack vector TAM Security control method Quantification of cyber risk |
| url | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1738573323001328 |
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