Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment
Cooperators that refuse to participate in sanctioning defectors create the second-order free-rider problem. Such cooperators will not be punished because they contribute to the public good, but they also eschew the costs associated with punishing defectors. Altruistic punishers—those that cooperate...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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IOP Publishing
2014-01-01
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| Series: | New Journal of Physics |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/16/8/083016 |
| _version_ | 1797751366915981312 |
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| author | Xiaojie Chen Attila Szolnoki Matjaž Perc |
| author_facet | Xiaojie Chen Attila Szolnoki Matjaž Perc |
| author_sort | Xiaojie Chen |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Cooperators that refuse to participate in sanctioning defectors create the second-order free-rider problem. Such cooperators will not be punished because they contribute to the public good, but they also eschew the costs associated with punishing defectors. Altruistic punishers—those that cooperate and punish—are at a disadvantage, and it is puzzling how such behaviour has evolved. We show that sharing the responsibility to sanction defectors rather than relying on certain individuals to do so permanently can solve the problem of costly punishment. Inspired by the fact that humans have strong but also emotional tendencies for fair play, we consider probabilistic sanctioning as the simplest way of distributing the duty. In well-mixed populations the public goods game is transformed into a coordination game with full cooperation and defection as the two stable equilibria, while in structured populations pattern formation supports additional counterintuitive solutions that are reminiscent of Parrondoʼs paradox. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-12T16:48:28Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-4a4b8370718b4cb8ae42e88e2029d77c |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1367-2630 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-12T16:48:28Z |
| publishDate | 2014-01-01 |
| publisher | IOP Publishing |
| record_format | Article |
| series | New Journal of Physics |
| spelling | doaj.art-4a4b8370718b4cb8ae42e88e2029d77c2023-08-08T11:28:06ZengIOP PublishingNew Journal of Physics1367-26302014-01-0116808301610.1088/1367-2630/16/8/083016Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishmentXiaojie Chen0Attila Szolnoki1Matjaž Perc2School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China , Chengdu 611731, People’s Republic of China; Evolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) , Schlossplatz 1, A-2361 Laxenburg, AustriaInstitute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Research Centre for Natural Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences , PO Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary; Institute of Mathematics , CNY, H-4400 Nyíregyháza, Sóstói u. 31/B, HungaryDepartment of Physics, Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor , Koroška cesta 160, SI-2000 Maribor, SloveniaCooperators that refuse to participate in sanctioning defectors create the second-order free-rider problem. Such cooperators will not be punished because they contribute to the public good, but they also eschew the costs associated with punishing defectors. Altruistic punishers—those that cooperate and punish—are at a disadvantage, and it is puzzling how such behaviour has evolved. We show that sharing the responsibility to sanction defectors rather than relying on certain individuals to do so permanently can solve the problem of costly punishment. Inspired by the fact that humans have strong but also emotional tendencies for fair play, we consider probabilistic sanctioning as the simplest way of distributing the duty. In well-mixed populations the public goods game is transformed into a coordination game with full cooperation and defection as the two stable equilibria, while in structured populations pattern formation supports additional counterintuitive solutions that are reminiscent of Parrondoʼs paradox.https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/16/8/083016social dynamicsnetworkspunishmentpublic goodseconophysics87.23.Ge |
| spellingShingle | Xiaojie Chen Attila Szolnoki Matjaž Perc Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment New Journal of Physics social dynamics networks punishment public goods econophysics 87.23.Ge |
| title | Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment |
| title_full | Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment |
| title_fullStr | Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment |
| title_full_unstemmed | Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment |
| title_short | Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment |
| title_sort | probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment |
| topic | social dynamics networks punishment public goods econophysics 87.23.Ge |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/16/8/083016 |
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