Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment
Cooperators that refuse to participate in sanctioning defectors create the second-order free-rider problem. Such cooperators will not be punished because they contribute to the public good, but they also eschew the costs associated with punishing defectors. Altruistic punishers—those that cooperate...
Main Authors: | Xiaojie Chen, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
IOP Publishing
2014-01-01
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Series: | New Journal of Physics |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/16/8/083016 |
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