Experiências, conhecimento fenomenal e materialismo

The claim that at least some of our mental states have qualitative, phenomenal features to which we have privileged cognitive access is intuitively plausible. Nevertheless, the claim is considered by many philosophers to be incompatible with a physicalist ontology. Some radical physicalists prefer s...

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Main Authors: Julia Telles Menezes, Wilson Mendonça
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina 2011-12-01
Series:Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2011v15n3p415/22387
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author Julia Telles Menezes
Wilson Mendonça
author_facet Julia Telles Menezes
Wilson Mendonça
author_sort Julia Telles Menezes
collection DOAJ
description The claim that at least some of our mental states have qualitative, phenomenal features to which we have privileged cognitive access is intuitively plausible. Nevertheless, the claim is considered by many philosophers to be incompatible with a physicalist ontology. Some radical physicalists prefer simply to deny the existence of the qualitative character of our mental states, whereas other physicalists try to reinterpret the knowledge of the phenomenal character of our experience as the acquisition of an ability, i.e., as a sort of know-how in opposition to the acquisition of an information (know-that). The paper presents and examines critically some recent attempts to compatibilize the sui generis nature of phenomenal knowledge with the materialist claim that the content of this sort of knowledge is constituted entirely by physical facts.
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spelling doaj.art-4a9f03ddd06b40bdba3fb146d4f8c34a2022-12-21T18:10:20ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology1414-42471808-17112011-12-01153415438Experiências, conhecimento fenomenal e materialismoJulia Telles MenezesWilson MendonçaThe claim that at least some of our mental states have qualitative, phenomenal features to which we have privileged cognitive access is intuitively plausible. Nevertheless, the claim is considered by many philosophers to be incompatible with a physicalist ontology. Some radical physicalists prefer simply to deny the existence of the qualitative character of our mental states, whereas other physicalists try to reinterpret the knowledge of the phenomenal character of our experience as the acquisition of an ability, i.e., as a sort of know-how in opposition to the acquisition of an information (know-that). The paper presents and examines critically some recent attempts to compatibilize the sui generis nature of phenomenal knowledge with the materialist claim that the content of this sort of knowledge is constituted entirely by physical facts.http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2011v15n3p415/22387Qualiaphenomenal knowledgephenomenal conceptsepistemic contextualism.
spellingShingle Julia Telles Menezes
Wilson Mendonça
Experiências, conhecimento fenomenal e materialismo
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
Qualia
phenomenal knowledge
phenomenal concepts
epistemic contextualism.
title Experiências, conhecimento fenomenal e materialismo
title_full Experiências, conhecimento fenomenal e materialismo
title_fullStr Experiências, conhecimento fenomenal e materialismo
title_full_unstemmed Experiências, conhecimento fenomenal e materialismo
title_short Experiências, conhecimento fenomenal e materialismo
title_sort experiencias conhecimento fenomenal e materialismo
topic Qualia
phenomenal knowledge
phenomenal concepts
epistemic contextualism.
url http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2011v15n3p415/22387
work_keys_str_mv AT juliatellesmenezes experienciasconhecimentofenomenalematerialismo
AT wilsonmendonca experienciasconhecimentofenomenalematerialismo