Neuroscientist who does not feel pain: Subjective ontology and the perspective anamorphosis of consciousness
Would the neuroscientist who does not feel pain know what he is studying? In this paper, the author analyzes the subjective ontology of conscious mental states and its origin – the subject’s first-person perspective. The ontology of the mental is irreducibly first-person ontology. In the thought ex...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | Bosnian |
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Filozofski fakultet Univerziteta u Banjoj Luci
2024-02-01
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Series: | Sineza |
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Online Access: | https://sineza.ff.unibl.org/sineza/article/view/92 |
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author | Andrija Jurić |
author_facet | Andrija Jurić |
author_sort | Andrija Jurić |
collection | DOAJ |
description |
Would the neuroscientist who does not feel pain know what he is studying? In this paper, the author analyzes the subjective ontology of conscious mental states and its origin – the subject’s first-person perspective. The ontology of the mental is irreducibly first-person ontology. In the thought experiment with neuroscientist Peter, it will be shown that a comprehensive science of consciousness requires a combined approach, as the phenomena of neuroscience are internally defined. The asymmetry between first-person and third-person perspectives regarding mental states will be strongly emphasized. The third part of the paper will offer a perspectival approach to the hard problem of consciousness. In conclusion, a truly objective science of subjectivity, a genuine science of consciousness, would have to engage scientifically with the subject’s egocentric first-person perspective.
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first_indexed | 2024-03-08T06:18:19Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-4ad68965378745aebab484ad053fcc55 |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 2712-1259 2712-1291 |
language | Bosnian |
last_indexed | 2024-03-08T06:18:19Z |
publishDate | 2024-02-01 |
publisher | Filozofski fakultet Univerziteta u Banjoj Luci |
record_format | Article |
series | Sineza |
spelling | doaj.art-4ad68965378745aebab484ad053fcc552024-02-04T14:35:05ZbosFilozofski fakultet Univerziteta u Banjoj LuciSineza2712-12592712-12912024-02-015110.7251/SIN2401001JNeuroscientist who does not feel pain: Subjective ontology and the perspective anamorphosis of consciousnessAndrija Jurić0University of Novi Sad, Faculty of Philosophy, Serbia Would the neuroscientist who does not feel pain know what he is studying? In this paper, the author analyzes the subjective ontology of conscious mental states and its origin – the subject’s first-person perspective. The ontology of the mental is irreducibly first-person ontology. In the thought experiment with neuroscientist Peter, it will be shown that a comprehensive science of consciousness requires a combined approach, as the phenomena of neuroscience are internally defined. The asymmetry between first-person and third-person perspectives regarding mental states will be strongly emphasized. The third part of the paper will offer a perspectival approach to the hard problem of consciousness. In conclusion, a truly objective science of subjectivity, a genuine science of consciousness, would have to engage scientifically with the subject’s egocentric first-person perspective. https://sineza.ff.unibl.org/sineza/article/view/92subjective ontologyfirst-person perspectivephenomenal qualitymental statesneuroscience |
spellingShingle | Andrija Jurić Neuroscientist who does not feel pain: Subjective ontology and the perspective anamorphosis of consciousness Sineza subjective ontology first-person perspective phenomenal quality mental states neuroscience |
title | Neuroscientist who does not feel pain: Subjective ontology and the perspective anamorphosis of consciousness |
title_full | Neuroscientist who does not feel pain: Subjective ontology and the perspective anamorphosis of consciousness |
title_fullStr | Neuroscientist who does not feel pain: Subjective ontology and the perspective anamorphosis of consciousness |
title_full_unstemmed | Neuroscientist who does not feel pain: Subjective ontology and the perspective anamorphosis of consciousness |
title_short | Neuroscientist who does not feel pain: Subjective ontology and the perspective anamorphosis of consciousness |
title_sort | neuroscientist who does not feel pain subjective ontology and the perspective anamorphosis of consciousness |
topic | subjective ontology first-person perspective phenomenal quality mental states neuroscience |
url | https://sineza.ff.unibl.org/sineza/article/view/92 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT andrijajuric neuroscientistwhodoesnotfeelpainsubjectiveontologyandtheperspectiveanamorphosisofconsciousness |