Neuroscientist who does not feel pain: Subjective ontology and the perspective anamorphosis of consciousness

Would the neuroscientist who does not feel pain know what he is studying? In this paper, the author analyzes the subjective ontology of conscious mental states and its origin – the subject’s first-person perspective. The ontology of the mental is irreducibly first-person ontology. In the thought ex...

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Main Author: Andrija Jurić
Format: Article
Language:Bosnian
Published: Filozofski fakultet Univerziteta u Banjoj Luci 2024-02-01
Series:Sineza
Subjects:
Online Access:https://sineza.ff.unibl.org/sineza/article/view/92
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author Andrija Jurić
author_facet Andrija Jurić
author_sort Andrija Jurić
collection DOAJ
description Would the neuroscientist who does not feel pain know what he is studying? In this paper, the author analyzes the subjective ontology of conscious mental states and its origin – the subject’s first-person perspective. The ontology of the mental is irreducibly first-person ontology. In the thought experiment with neuroscientist Peter, it will be shown that a comprehensive science of consciousness requires a combined approach, as the phenomena of neuroscience are internally defined. The asymmetry between first-person and third-person perspectives regarding mental states will be strongly emphasized. The third part of the paper will offer a perspectival approach to the hard problem of consciousness. In conclusion, a truly objective science of subjectivity, a genuine science of consciousness, would have to engage scientifically with the subject’s egocentric first-person perspective.
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spelling doaj.art-4ad68965378745aebab484ad053fcc552024-02-04T14:35:05ZbosFilozofski fakultet Univerziteta u Banjoj LuciSineza2712-12592712-12912024-02-015110.7251/SIN2401001JNeuroscientist who does not feel pain: Subjective ontology and the perspective anamorphosis of consciousnessAndrija Jurić0University of Novi Sad, Faculty of Philosophy, Serbia Would the neuroscientist who does not feel pain know what he is studying? In this paper, the author analyzes the subjective ontology of conscious mental states and its origin – the subject’s first-person perspective. The ontology of the mental is irreducibly first-person ontology. In the thought experiment with neuroscientist Peter, it will be shown that a comprehensive science of consciousness requires a combined approach, as the phenomena of neuroscience are internally defined. The asymmetry between first-person and third-person perspectives regarding mental states will be strongly emphasized. The third part of the paper will offer a perspectival approach to the hard problem of consciousness. In conclusion, a truly objective science of subjectivity, a genuine science of consciousness, would have to engage scientifically with the subject’s egocentric first-person perspective. https://sineza.ff.unibl.org/sineza/article/view/92subjective ontologyfirst-person perspectivephenomenal qualitymental statesneuroscience
spellingShingle Andrija Jurić
Neuroscientist who does not feel pain: Subjective ontology and the perspective anamorphosis of consciousness
Sineza
subjective ontology
first-person perspective
phenomenal quality
mental states
neuroscience
title Neuroscientist who does not feel pain: Subjective ontology and the perspective anamorphosis of consciousness
title_full Neuroscientist who does not feel pain: Subjective ontology and the perspective anamorphosis of consciousness
title_fullStr Neuroscientist who does not feel pain: Subjective ontology and the perspective anamorphosis of consciousness
title_full_unstemmed Neuroscientist who does not feel pain: Subjective ontology and the perspective anamorphosis of consciousness
title_short Neuroscientist who does not feel pain: Subjective ontology and the perspective anamorphosis of consciousness
title_sort neuroscientist who does not feel pain subjective ontology and the perspective anamorphosis of consciousness
topic subjective ontology
first-person perspective
phenomenal quality
mental states
neuroscience
url https://sineza.ff.unibl.org/sineza/article/view/92
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