Deficit of conceivability: response to Bogdan Faul’s article «Minimal dualism and epistemic approach»
The argument in defense of minimal dualism presented in Bogdan Faul’s article presents the idea that we can conceive consciousness existing only in the introspection without a physical body. From that kind of conceivability follows the possibility of consciousness. And this leads to the falsity o...
Main Author: | T. S. Demin |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Omsk State Technical University, Federal State Budgetary Educational Institution of Higher Education
2021-02-01
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Series: | Омский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность" |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.omgtu.ru/general_information/media_omgtu/journal_of_omsk_research_journal/files/arhiv/2021/%D0%A2.%206,%20%E2%84%96%201%20(%D0%9E%D0%98%D0%A1)/91-94%20%D0%94%D0%B5%D0%BC%D0%B8%D0%BD%20%D0%A2.%20%D0%A1..pdf |
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