Electricity economics for ex‐ante double‐sided auction mechanism in restructured power market

Abstract Auction mechanism analysis provides favourable economic outcomes for key stakeholders involved in the restructured power market. Real power pricing based on locational marginal pricing has been implemented in the electricity market worldwide. In this study, the optimal power flow is conside...

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Main Authors: Aruna Kanagaraj, Kumudini Devi Raguru Pandu
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2022-02-01
Series:Energy Conversion and Economics
Subjects:
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1049/enc2.12037
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author Aruna Kanagaraj
Kumudini Devi Raguru Pandu
author_facet Aruna Kanagaraj
Kumudini Devi Raguru Pandu
author_sort Aruna Kanagaraj
collection DOAJ
description Abstract Auction mechanism analysis provides favourable economic outcomes for key stakeholders involved in the restructured power market. Real power pricing based on locational marginal pricing has been implemented in the electricity market worldwide. In this study, the optimal power flow is considered to minimise the operating cost of the active power generation in the ex‐ante energy market and an augmented optimal power flow in the ex‐ante reserve market. The double‐sided auction mechanism has better control over the energy and reserve markets, enhancing social welfare in the restructured power markets. Single‐ and double‐sided auction mechanisms are considered to analyse the allocation and pricing economics in the ex‐ante day‐ahead energy and ex‐ante day‐ahead reserve markets. Locational marginal pricing is calculated and analysed for both the on‐and off‐peak demand periods. The proposed auction model was validated using an IEEE 30‐bus power system. The benefits of the double‐sided auction are assessed from technical and economic perspectives.
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spelling doaj.art-4b47dcd943a444d7a2764be769c2e8a12023-02-21T10:40:57ZengWileyEnergy Conversion and Economics2634-15812022-02-0131313710.1049/enc2.12037Electricity economics for ex‐ante double‐sided auction mechanism in restructured power marketAruna Kanagaraj0Kumudini Devi Raguru Pandu1Department of EEE, College of Engineering Guindy Anna University Chennai Tamil Nadu IndiaDepartment of EEE, College of Engineering Guindy Anna University Chennai Tamil Nadu IndiaAbstract Auction mechanism analysis provides favourable economic outcomes for key stakeholders involved in the restructured power market. Real power pricing based on locational marginal pricing has been implemented in the electricity market worldwide. In this study, the optimal power flow is considered to minimise the operating cost of the active power generation in the ex‐ante energy market and an augmented optimal power flow in the ex‐ante reserve market. The double‐sided auction mechanism has better control over the energy and reserve markets, enhancing social welfare in the restructured power markets. Single‐ and double‐sided auction mechanisms are considered to analyse the allocation and pricing economics in the ex‐ante day‐ahead energy and ex‐ante day‐ahead reserve markets. Locational marginal pricing is calculated and analysed for both the on‐and off‐peak demand periods. The proposed auction model was validated using an IEEE 30‐bus power system. The benefits of the double‐sided auction are assessed from technical and economic perspectives.https://doi.org/10.1049/enc2.12037Power system management, operation and economicsControl of electric power systems
spellingShingle Aruna Kanagaraj
Kumudini Devi Raguru Pandu
Electricity economics for ex‐ante double‐sided auction mechanism in restructured power market
Energy Conversion and Economics
Power system management, operation and economics
Control of electric power systems
title Electricity economics for ex‐ante double‐sided auction mechanism in restructured power market
title_full Electricity economics for ex‐ante double‐sided auction mechanism in restructured power market
title_fullStr Electricity economics for ex‐ante double‐sided auction mechanism in restructured power market
title_full_unstemmed Electricity economics for ex‐ante double‐sided auction mechanism in restructured power market
title_short Electricity economics for ex‐ante double‐sided auction mechanism in restructured power market
title_sort electricity economics for ex ante double sided auction mechanism in restructured power market
topic Power system management, operation and economics
Control of electric power systems
url https://doi.org/10.1049/enc2.12037
work_keys_str_mv AT arunakanagaraj electricityeconomicsforexantedoublesidedauctionmechanisminrestructuredpowermarket
AT kumudinideviragurupandu electricityeconomicsforexantedoublesidedauctionmechanisminrestructuredpowermarket