Electricity economics for ex‐ante double‐sided auction mechanism in restructured power market
Abstract Auction mechanism analysis provides favourable economic outcomes for key stakeholders involved in the restructured power market. Real power pricing based on locational marginal pricing has been implemented in the electricity market worldwide. In this study, the optimal power flow is conside...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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Wiley
2022-02-01
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Series: | Energy Conversion and Economics |
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Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1049/enc2.12037 |
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author | Aruna Kanagaraj Kumudini Devi Raguru Pandu |
author_facet | Aruna Kanagaraj Kumudini Devi Raguru Pandu |
author_sort | Aruna Kanagaraj |
collection | DOAJ |
description | Abstract Auction mechanism analysis provides favourable economic outcomes for key stakeholders involved in the restructured power market. Real power pricing based on locational marginal pricing has been implemented in the electricity market worldwide. In this study, the optimal power flow is considered to minimise the operating cost of the active power generation in the ex‐ante energy market and an augmented optimal power flow in the ex‐ante reserve market. The double‐sided auction mechanism has better control over the energy and reserve markets, enhancing social welfare in the restructured power markets. Single‐ and double‐sided auction mechanisms are considered to analyse the allocation and pricing economics in the ex‐ante day‐ahead energy and ex‐ante day‐ahead reserve markets. Locational marginal pricing is calculated and analysed for both the on‐and off‐peak demand periods. The proposed auction model was validated using an IEEE 30‐bus power system. The benefits of the double‐sided auction are assessed from technical and economic perspectives. |
first_indexed | 2024-04-10T09:02:05Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-4b47dcd943a444d7a2764be769c2e8a1 |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 2634-1581 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-04-10T09:02:05Z |
publishDate | 2022-02-01 |
publisher | Wiley |
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series | Energy Conversion and Economics |
spelling | doaj.art-4b47dcd943a444d7a2764be769c2e8a12023-02-21T10:40:57ZengWileyEnergy Conversion and Economics2634-15812022-02-0131313710.1049/enc2.12037Electricity economics for ex‐ante double‐sided auction mechanism in restructured power marketAruna Kanagaraj0Kumudini Devi Raguru Pandu1Department of EEE, College of Engineering Guindy Anna University Chennai Tamil Nadu IndiaDepartment of EEE, College of Engineering Guindy Anna University Chennai Tamil Nadu IndiaAbstract Auction mechanism analysis provides favourable economic outcomes for key stakeholders involved in the restructured power market. Real power pricing based on locational marginal pricing has been implemented in the electricity market worldwide. In this study, the optimal power flow is considered to minimise the operating cost of the active power generation in the ex‐ante energy market and an augmented optimal power flow in the ex‐ante reserve market. The double‐sided auction mechanism has better control over the energy and reserve markets, enhancing social welfare in the restructured power markets. Single‐ and double‐sided auction mechanisms are considered to analyse the allocation and pricing economics in the ex‐ante day‐ahead energy and ex‐ante day‐ahead reserve markets. Locational marginal pricing is calculated and analysed for both the on‐and off‐peak demand periods. The proposed auction model was validated using an IEEE 30‐bus power system. The benefits of the double‐sided auction are assessed from technical and economic perspectives.https://doi.org/10.1049/enc2.12037Power system management, operation and economicsControl of electric power systems |
spellingShingle | Aruna Kanagaraj Kumudini Devi Raguru Pandu Electricity economics for ex‐ante double‐sided auction mechanism in restructured power market Energy Conversion and Economics Power system management, operation and economics Control of electric power systems |
title | Electricity economics for ex‐ante double‐sided auction mechanism in restructured power market |
title_full | Electricity economics for ex‐ante double‐sided auction mechanism in restructured power market |
title_fullStr | Electricity economics for ex‐ante double‐sided auction mechanism in restructured power market |
title_full_unstemmed | Electricity economics for ex‐ante double‐sided auction mechanism in restructured power market |
title_short | Electricity economics for ex‐ante double‐sided auction mechanism in restructured power market |
title_sort | electricity economics for ex ante double sided auction mechanism in restructured power market |
topic | Power system management, operation and economics Control of electric power systems |
url | https://doi.org/10.1049/enc2.12037 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT arunakanagaraj electricityeconomicsforexantedoublesidedauctionmechanisminrestructuredpowermarket AT kumudinideviragurupandu electricityeconomicsforexantedoublesidedauctionmechanisminrestructuredpowermarket |