Against the Equal Weight View in the Epistemology of Disagreement

In this paper I propose an argument against the conciliatory view in peer disagreement. One of the most important grounds for conciliatory views is the assumption that the epistemic situation in peer disagreement between two peers is symmetri cal. Symmetry justifies the conciliatory views. If so, sh...

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Main Author: امید کریم زاده
Format: Article
Language:fas
Published: Allameh Tabataba'i University Press 2018-12-01
Series:حکمت و فلسفه
Subjects:
Online Access:https://wph.atu.ac.ir/article_9787_b5b8c305c86be83120c5c630d9905957.pdf
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author امید کریم زاده
author_facet امید کریم زاده
author_sort امید کریم زاده
collection DOAJ
description In this paper I propose an argument against the conciliatory view in peer disagreement. One of the most important grounds for conciliatory views is the assumption that the epistemic situation in peer disagreement between two peers is symmetri cal. Symmetry justifies the conciliatory views. If so, showing that the situation is actually asymmetric should count as a refutation to conciliatory views of disagreement. By appealing to the difference between the processes by which the beliefs of the two parties have been formed, I try to show that there is a difference between the reliabilities of the two beliefs. This means the asymmetrical situation between two peers in disagreement. Since the conciliatory and steadfast views are contradictory views, any argument against one of them should be considered as an argument for the other.
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spelling doaj.art-4d004449de8e4ae2a8b870f1df5bca9b2023-12-18T10:46:18ZfasAllameh Tabataba'i University Pressحکمت و فلسفه1735-32382476-60382018-12-011456435910.22054/wph.2019.27680.14819787Against the Equal Weight View in the Epistemology of Disagreementامید کریم زاده0عضو هیات علمی دانشگاه شهید بهشتیIn this paper I propose an argument against the conciliatory view in peer disagreement. One of the most important grounds for conciliatory views is the assumption that the epistemic situation in peer disagreement between two peers is symmetri cal. Symmetry justifies the conciliatory views. If so, showing that the situation is actually asymmetric should count as a refutation to conciliatory views of disagreement. By appealing to the difference between the processes by which the beliefs of the two parties have been formed, I try to show that there is a difference between the reliabilities of the two beliefs. This means the asymmetrical situation between two peers in disagreement. Since the conciliatory and steadfast views are contradictory views, any argument against one of them should be considered as an argument for the other.https://wph.atu.ac.ir/article_9787_b5b8c305c86be83120c5c630d9905957.pdfconciliatory viewdisagreementintuitionvisionasymmetrynormative judgement.  
spellingShingle امید کریم زاده
Against the Equal Weight View in the Epistemology of Disagreement
حکمت و فلسفه
conciliatory view
disagreement
intuition
vision
asymmetry
normative judgement.  
title Against the Equal Weight View in the Epistemology of Disagreement
title_full Against the Equal Weight View in the Epistemology of Disagreement
title_fullStr Against the Equal Weight View in the Epistemology of Disagreement
title_full_unstemmed Against the Equal Weight View in the Epistemology of Disagreement
title_short Against the Equal Weight View in the Epistemology of Disagreement
title_sort against the equal weight view in the epistemology of disagreement
topic conciliatory view
disagreement
intuition
vision
asymmetry
normative judgement.  
url https://wph.atu.ac.ir/article_9787_b5b8c305c86be83120c5c630d9905957.pdf
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