Optimal decisions of countries with carbon tax and carbon tariff

<p><strong><em>Purpose: </em></strong>Reducing carbon emission has been the core problem of controlling global warming and climate deterioration recently. This paper focuses on the optimal carbon taxation policy levied by countries and the impact on firms’ optimal produ...

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Main Authors: Yumei Hou, Meng Jia, Xin Tian, Fangfang Wei, Kun Wei
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: OmniaScience 2015-05-01
Series:Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.jiem.org/index.php/jiem/article/view/1506
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author Yumei Hou
Meng Jia
Xin Tian
Fangfang Wei
Kun Wei
author_facet Yumei Hou
Meng Jia
Xin Tian
Fangfang Wei
Kun Wei
author_sort Yumei Hou
collection DOAJ
description <p><strong><em>Purpose: </em></strong>Reducing carbon emission has been the core problem of controlling global warming and climate deterioration recently. This paper focuses on the optimal carbon taxation policy levied by countries and the impact on firms’ optimal production decisions.</p> <p><strong><em>Design/methodology/approach:</em></strong><strong> </strong>This paper uses a two-stage game theory model to analyze the impact of carbon tariff and tax. Numerical simulation is used to supplement the theoretical analysis.</p> <p><strong><em>Findings</em></strong><strong>: </strong>Results derived from the paper indicate that the demand in an unstable market is significantly affected by environmental damage level. Carbon tariff is a policy-oriented tax while the carbon tax is a market-oriented one. Comprehensive carbon taxation policy benefit developed countries and basic policy is more suitable for developing countries.</p> <p><strong><em>Research limitations/implications</em></strong><strong>: </strong>In this research, we do not consider random demand and asymmetric information, which may not well suited the reality.</p> <p><strong><em>Originality/value:</em></strong> This work provides a different perspective in analyzing the impact of carbon tax and tariff. It is the first study to consider two consuming market and the strategic game between two countries. Different international status of countries considered in the paper is also a unique point.</p>
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spelling doaj.art-4dcf18c7324d46c492bf093a2c4afe062022-12-21T17:43:48ZengOmniaScienceJournal of Industrial Engineering and Management2013-84232013-09532015-05-0183981100110.3926/jiem.1506373Optimal decisions of countries with carbon tax and carbon tariffYumei Hou0Meng Jia1Xin Tian2Fangfang Wei3Kun Wei4Yanshan UniversityYanshan University1.Chinese Academy of Sciences, Research Center on Fictitious Economy and Data Science 2.Key Laboratory of Big Data Mining and Knowledge ManagementYanshan UniversityThe Postdoctoral Innovation Practice Base, The First Hospital of Qinhuangdao,<p><strong><em>Purpose: </em></strong>Reducing carbon emission has been the core problem of controlling global warming and climate deterioration recently. This paper focuses on the optimal carbon taxation policy levied by countries and the impact on firms’ optimal production decisions.</p> <p><strong><em>Design/methodology/approach:</em></strong><strong> </strong>This paper uses a two-stage game theory model to analyze the impact of carbon tariff and tax. Numerical simulation is used to supplement the theoretical analysis.</p> <p><strong><em>Findings</em></strong><strong>: </strong>Results derived from the paper indicate that the demand in an unstable market is significantly affected by environmental damage level. Carbon tariff is a policy-oriented tax while the carbon tax is a market-oriented one. Comprehensive carbon taxation policy benefit developed countries and basic policy is more suitable for developing countries.</p> <p><strong><em>Research limitations/implications</em></strong><strong>: </strong>In this research, we do not consider random demand and asymmetric information, which may not well suited the reality.</p> <p><strong><em>Originality/value:</em></strong> This work provides a different perspective in analyzing the impact of carbon tax and tariff. It is the first study to consider two consuming market and the strategic game between two countries. Different international status of countries considered in the paper is also a unique point.</p>http://www.jiem.org/index.php/jiem/article/view/1506carbon tax, carbon tariff, leader-follower game, social welfare
spellingShingle Yumei Hou
Meng Jia
Xin Tian
Fangfang Wei
Kun Wei
Optimal decisions of countries with carbon tax and carbon tariff
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management
carbon tax, carbon tariff, leader-follower game, social welfare
title Optimal decisions of countries with carbon tax and carbon tariff
title_full Optimal decisions of countries with carbon tax and carbon tariff
title_fullStr Optimal decisions of countries with carbon tax and carbon tariff
title_full_unstemmed Optimal decisions of countries with carbon tax and carbon tariff
title_short Optimal decisions of countries with carbon tax and carbon tariff
title_sort optimal decisions of countries with carbon tax and carbon tariff
topic carbon tax, carbon tariff, leader-follower game, social welfare
url http://www.jiem.org/index.php/jiem/article/view/1506
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AT mengjia optimaldecisionsofcountrieswithcarbontaxandcarbontariff
AT xintian optimaldecisionsofcountrieswithcarbontaxandcarbontariff
AT fangfangwei optimaldecisionsofcountrieswithcarbontaxandcarbontariff
AT kunwei optimaldecisionsofcountrieswithcarbontaxandcarbontariff